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CIRCUIT CIRCUS:  WHAT IS THE CORRECT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO 
SUPERVISED RELEASE APPEALS AFTER 
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“In a final irony, he had to kill the [Sentencing] [G]uidelines 
to save them.”1 
Luci is a young woman with a troubled past.2  She was convicted 
nearly nine years ago of possessing ammunition as a felon and sentenced 
to 120 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised 
release.  Supervised release functions as a distinct form of punishment, 
which is imposed by a trial court and served in addition to a prison 
term.3  Luci executed her prison time and was discharged to complete 
her three-year term of supervised release in the community.  She served 
two years of that punishment successfully before being convicted in a 
state court of attempting to elude police on a motorcycle, a crime which 
placed her in violation of a condition of her release.  As a result, an 
Indiana federal district court ordered Luci to serve a sentence of twenty 
months re-imprisonment, which she has decided to appeal.  When Luci 
appeals that determination to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, she 
needs to be able to argue that either:  (1) the district court’s 
determination should be set aside because it is “unreasonable”; or (2) it 
should be set aside because it is “plainly unreasonable.”4  It is imperative 
to have a consistent and uniform standard so that Luci knows if, when, 
and how to plead her appeal, and additionally, so that the proper degree 
of deference is afforded to the district court.5  At the present time, given 
the Seventh Circuit’s standard, Luci will argue that her sentence is 
                                                 
1 Cliff Sloan, Supreme Court Brief:  Judge vs. Jury, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 18, 2005, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2005/01/18/supreme-court-brief-judge-vs-
jury.html (discussing the paradox in the United States v. Booker decision given Justice 
Stephen Breyer’s role in creating the Sentencing Guidelines as chief counsel of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and as a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 
the 1980s).  Breyer’s remedial opinion saves the Sentencing Guidelines’ handiwork for 
judges, but makes them optional rather than compulsory.  Id. 
2 Luci is a hypothetical defendant.  This narrative is loosely based on the case of United 
States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2007).  The facts have been changed slightly by the 
author. 
3 See infra Part II.A (explaining the concept of supervised release). 
4 Sloan, supra note 1. 
5 Id. 
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“plainly unreasonable.”6  However, if she were a defendant in the Sixth 
Circuit, for example, the standard would be one of “reasonableness.”7  
Such inconsistent standards of review among the circuits reflect 
negatively on the evenhandness of the judiciary.8 
United States v. Booker imparted both constitutional clarity and utter 
confusion to the United States sentencing system.9  The waters remain 
murky regarding the review of sentences imposed following the 
revocation of a defendant’s supervised release.  Since Booker, ten of the 
nation’s thirteen federal circuits have confronted the issue, and nine have 
taken a stance on which standard is correct.10  When analyzing this issue, 
the courts have chiefly confronted two broad questions:  (1) whether, by 
announcing a standard of “reasonableness” review in Booker, the 
Supreme Court meant to replace the “plainly unreasonable” standard 
that the courts had been using in hearing appeals of supervised release 
revocations; and (2) whether there is any real distinction between these 
two standards.11 
This Note specifically addresses the current state of the circuit split 
as well as ideas on the correct standard of review for revocations of 
supervised release.  While most of the circuits have gravitated toward 
the “reasonableness” standard, they continue to struggle internally over 
whether there is an actual difference between the “plainly unreasonable” 
                                                 
6 See infra Part II.C–D (detailing the division among the circuits and the two basic 
standards of review currently utilized). 
7 See infra Part II.D (discussing the “reasonableness” standard of review, which has 
been adopted by the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
8 See WORLD TRADE ORG., KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:  THE FIRST TEN 
YEARS 161–62 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005) (noting that standards of review are 
a very large part of procedural law in general).  They play an important role in judicial 
review.  Id.  “However, standards of review fulfil [sic] not only a procedural function but 
can also represent a deliberate allocation of power between an authority taking a measure 
and a judicial organ reviewing it.”  Id. at 162. 
9 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  “[T]he Supreme Court’s decisions in 
United States v. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005) . . . converted the mandatory sentencing regime that had been in place since 1984 to 
an advisory one . . . .”  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET:  THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. 
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
documents/United_States_v_Booker_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
10 Elizabeth Stewart Hall, Comment, Determining the Proper Standard of Review for 
Sentences Imposed After Revocation of Supervised Release in United States v. Bolds, 32 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 405, 410–11 (2008).  “Though some of the circuits have refused to make a 
decision on the issue, a majority of the circuits have chosen a standard to apply, albeit not 
the same.”  Id.; see United States v. Smith, 255 F. App’x 867, 868 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that Booker left numerous issues unsettled for the circuit courts and that the federal 
judiciary has wrestled to identify the correct standard of review for revocations of 
supervised release). 
11 Hall, supra note 10, at 410–11. 
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and the “reasonableness” standards.12  Furthermore, some circuits have 
gone the opposite direction, choosing “plainly unreasonable” as the 
correct standard.13  In addition, some circuits have not yet addressed 
what the correct standard is, and one circuit has refused to decide the 
question at this time.14 
Much activity has taken place at the federal appellate level post-
Booker, and most circuits have key cases announcing an opinion on the 
correct standard—either contributing to the arrival of a standard in a 
meaningful way or simply refusing to confront the issue.15  Significant 
strengths and weaknesses are present in each of the stances and it 
remains unclear what the Supreme Court views to be the correct 
standard.16 
This Note attempts to give a voice to defendants like Luci and 
resolve the split among the circuits.  Part II of this Note describes 
supervised release and gives the historical foundation of the split.17  Part 
III analyzes the current state of the circuit split.18  Part IV concludes with 
a proposed application note and model judicial reasoning.19 
                                                 
12 See infra Part II.D (explaining the “reasonableness” approach and detailing the 
subscribing circuits). 
13 See infra Part II.C (describing the “plainly unreasonable” approach as the minority 
position). 
14 See infra Part II.B (noting that some circuits have not yet taken a stance as to the correct 
approach). 
15 See United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 541 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the proper 
standard is “reasonableness”); United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the proper standard is “reasonableness”); United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 
672, 675 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the proper standard is “plainly unreasonable”); 
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the proper standard 
is “plainly unreasonable”); United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 
2006) (holding that the proper standard is “reasonableness”); United States v. Miqbel, 444 
F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the proper standard is “reasonableness”); 
United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the proper standard is 
“reasonableness”); United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
the proper standard is “reasonableness”); United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159, 1161 
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that the proper standard is “reasonableness”); infra Part II (laying 
the foundation for an analysis of the split among the circuits). 
16 For example, this Note proposes that Rita and Gall have added a further layer of 
confusion, rather than clarity, to the analysis.  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); see infra Part III.C.1 (detailing Rita  and Gall’s impacts on 
the analysis of the correct post-Booker standard of review). 
17 See infra Part II (giving background on this topic). 
18 See infra Part III (analyzing potential criticisms of the plainly unreasonable standard, 
Booker, and the ease with which a portion of the SRA can be severed). 
19 See infra Part IV (offering a potential solution to the split among the circuits utilizing 
the “plainly unreasonable” standard). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
United States v. Booker has been a watershed in the United States 
sentencing system.20  Since Booker, the appellate courts have attempted to 
resolve whether the Supreme Court meant to replace the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard used by courts in hearing post-revocation 
appeals, and whether there is a real difference between the “plainly 
unreasonable” and “reasonableness” standards.21  This Note specifically 
focuses on the current state of the circuit split and advances ideas on the 
correct standard of review for revocations of supervised release; each of 
the stances taken by the different circuits have both strengths and 
weaknesses, and the Supreme Court’s views about the proper standard 
remain ambiguous.22 
Part II of this Note gives a summary and history of supervised 
release and explains the impact of Booker on the current state of affairs in 
the federal appellate courts respecting their standards of review for 
supervised release revocations.  Part II.A gives details regarding 
supervised release as a sentencing concept and the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard that came about with the Sentencing Reform Act 
(“SRA”) and the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing 
Guidelines”).23  Part II.B reveals how Booker sent this system into a state 
of unrest.24  It also shows the gradual unfolding in the aftermath of 
Booker and the formation of an uneven circuit split.25  The circuits have 
utilized two main approaches in an attempt to choose a standard of 
review for revocations of supervised release:  the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard and the “reasonableness” standard.26  Part II.C focuses on the 
“plainly unreasonable” standard.27  Part II.D discusses the 
“reasonableness” standard and shows the internal division among the 
circuits that use the “reasonableness” standard:  some circuits find no 
                                                 
20 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  As the Booker majority noted, sentencing 
appeals, sentencing departures, and revocations of supervised release are important 
concerns within the United States’ criminal justice system.  Id. at 262. 
21 Hall, supra note 10, at 410–11. 
22 See infra Part III.C.1 (detailing Rita  and Gall’s impacts on the analysis of the rightful 
standard of review). 
23 See infra Part II.A (giving a summary of supervised release and the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard). 
24 See infra Part II.B (explaining what Booker did to the “plainly unreasonable” standard 
and what happened in the wake of Booker). 
25 See infra Part II.B (describing Booker’s impact on the “plainly unreasonable” standard). 
26 See infra Part II.C–D (detailing the division among the circuits and the two basic 
standards of review currently utilized). 
27 See infra Part II.C (explaining the “plainly unreasonable” standard and the 
methodologies and theories of the subscribing circuits). 
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difference between the two standards while others see a difference, but 
nevertheless choose to follow the “reasonableness” guidepost.28 
A. Summary of Supervised Release and the “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard 
Supervised release is unique because it functions as an additional 
phase of punishment following a period of incarceration.29  After being 
found guilty of a crime at the trial court level, a defendant may be 
sentenced to both a term of incarceration and a term of supervised 
release.30  Supervised release sentences, as seen in Luci’s case above, are 
served after completion of the incarceration period.31  Supervised release 
comes with conditions, which, if violated, can lead to consequences 
including re-imprisonment or an extension or modification of the terms 
of the supervised release period.32  The determination that a violation 
has occurred is made by a trial court and is appealable, and, as with all 
appeals, the amount of discretion that the appellate court shall afford the 
trial court’s decision is governed by a standard of review.33 
                                                 
28 See infra Part II.D (discussing the “reasonableness” standard). 
29 See infra Part II.A.1 (differentiating between parole and supervised release). 
30 See infra Part II.A.1 (expounding on the imposition of supervised release). 
31 See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (introducing this hypothetical). 
32 See Understanding the Requirements of Supervised Release and Probation Supervision, U.S. 
PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERVICES OFF. DISTRICT R.I., http://www.rip.uscourts.gov/rip/ 
supervision/understandingthereqs/UnderstandingtheRequirements.pdf (last visited Oct. 
2, 2011) (stating that imposition of a prison sentence and more supervised release likely 
follows revocation of a term of supervised release to ensure that an offender’s re-entry is 
both safe for the community and successful for the participant).  According to this source, 
nationwide supervised revocation rates are approximately twelve to fifteen percent 
(meaning that somewhere between eighty-five and eighty-eight percent of offenders 
successfully complete their term of supervised release without revocation).  Id.  Violations 
of supervised release leading to revocation do not constitute separate charges because 
supervised release is only “a continuation of the original charge.”  United States v. Valdez-
Sanchez, 414 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 2005).  “The supervised release period is an 
independent element of the [original] sentence.  It is not carved out of the maximum 
permissible time allotted for incarceration under some other criminal statute.”  United 
States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 489 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Douglas A. Morris, Representing a 
Client Charged with Violating Conditions of Supervised Release—Part I, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. 
LAW., Nov. 2006, at 28, available at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=927& 
terms=douglas+morris+and+representing+a+client+charged+with+violating (giving a 
practitioner’s view of supervised release mechanics). 
33 See Thomas A. Sheehan, Standard of Review on Appeal, 53 J. MO. B. 281, 281 (1997), 
available at http://www.mobar.org/journal/1997/sepoct/sheehan.htm (“The standard of 
review determines the degree of scrutiny the appellate court will apply when reviewing the 
rulings made below. . . . The impact of the standard of review is enormous.”). 
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The concept of supervised release is not old, as it originated with the 
introduction of the SRA and the Sentencing Guidelines.34  Similar to 
other types of sentences, there are specific repercussions for a breach of 
the terms of a defendant’s supervised release.35  However, the policy 
statements outlining the requirements of supervised release are 
significantly different from the Sentencing Guidelines controlling other 
types of sentences.36  18 U.S.C. § 3742 housed the traditional standard of 
review pertaining to revocations of supervised release pre-Booker.37 
1. The Creation of Supervised Release and What Happens When a 
Person Violates the Terms of Their Supervised Release 
The SRA, which accompanied the implementation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, created supervised release in 1984.38  Supervised release is 
essentially a form of post-imprisonment supervision that may be 
imposed by a trial court as a part of an initial sentence of 
imprisonment.39  It differs from parole in that supervised release does 
not replace a portion of an imprisonment term.40  Supervised release is 
                                                 
34 See infra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining the origin of supervised release as 
a sentencing concept). 
35 See infra Part II.A.1 (detailing what happens after a defendant violates his or her 
supervised release terms). 
36 See infra Part II.A.1 (outlining the differences between policy statements and the once 
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines). 
37 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the traditional pre-Booker standard of review). 
38 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009). 
39 Id.; see Bob Katzen, Beacon Hill Roll Call:  Local Senators’ 2010 Per Diems Announced, 
TAUNTON DAILY GAZETTE (Jan. 16, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.tauntongazette.com/ 
state_news/x512660834/BEACON-HILL-ROLL-CALL-Local-senators-2010-per-diems-
announced (exemplifying that supervised release is a common sentencing tool, even for 
defendants who have not spent much time in the system).  For example, the U.S. Attorney’s 
office announced in 2010 “that Patrice Tierney, wife of Congressman John Tierney, was 
sentenced to [thirty] days in prison and then two years of supervised release, including five 
months of home confinement, on charges of aiding and abetting the filing of false federal 
tax returns for her brother.”  Id.; see also Eric Tucker, Judge:  ‘Survivor’ Winner Broke Terms of 
Release, ABC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/wireStory?id= 
12579156 (demonstrating that even the rich and famous are sometimes sentenced to 
supervised release).  “Reality TV star Richard Hatch violated the terms of his supervised 
release by failing to refile his tax returns, a judge ruled Monday, but he said he hadn’t 
decided whether to put the ‘Survivor’ winner back behind bars.  He delayed sentencing 
until he could receive additional arguments.”  Id. 
40 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009).  According to the 
Sentencing Guidelines, “[u]nlike parole, a term of supervised release does not replace a 
portion of the sentence of imprisonment, but rather is an order of supervision in addition to 
any term of imprisonment imposed by the court.”  Id.  “[S]upervised release is more 
analogous to the additional ‘special parole term’ previously authorized for certain drug 
offenses.”  Id.  A strict definition of supervised release is as follows:  “[s]upervised release 
[is] the period of time when an offender, serving a determinate sentence, is supervised in 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 9
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also different from probation because it is imposed following 
imprisonment, whereas probation is imposed in place of imprisonment.41  
Once a defendant is adjudged to have violated a condition of his or her 
supervised release, the court has the option of continuing the defendant 
on supervised release, with the choice of extending or modifying the 
conditions of the term, or revoking the supervised release altogether and 
imposing an additional term of incarceration.42  The periods of 
imprisonment authorized by statute for violating a stipulation of 
supervised release are normally more limited than those available for a 
violation of probation.43 
                                                                                                             
the community following release from the prison portion of the offender’s sentence.  It is 
expressed in terms of a set number of months.”  Victim Assistance Program:  
Terms/Definitions, MINN. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.corr.state.mn.us/crimevictim/ 
terms.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
41 See Morris, supra note 32 (highlighting the differences between supervised release and 
probation). 
42 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009); see Brendan Kirby, Judge 
Sentences ‘Bonnie and Clyde’ Couple for String of Drug-Fueled Bank Robberies, PRESS-REGISTER 
(Jan. 30, 2011, 7:10 AM), http://blog.al.com/live/2011/01/judge_sentences_bonnie-and-
cly.html (giving just one example of how a defendant can break the terms of his or her 
supervised release).  Jerry Tinsely violated his supervised release by going on a drug-
fueled robbery spree with his girlfriend in “Bonnie and Clyde” fashion in March of 2010.  
Id.  The judge gave Tinsley a six year and five month prison sentence for his new charges, 
and also “revoked his supervised release on a federal gun charge and ordered him to go to 
prison for [two] years in that case.”  Id.; see also Ty Tagami, Doctor Who Didn’t Want to Work 
Going Back to Prison, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 27, 2011, 7:18 PM), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/doctor-who-didnt-want-818257.html (giving an example of an 
unusual revocation of supervised release).  “A doctor released from prison after serving 
time for tax evasion will be going back because of a scheme he concocted to avoid getting a 
job.”  Id.  Dr. Brown was out on supervised release after serving time in prison for federal 
tax evasion.  Id.  “A condition of his release was that he look for a job.  His release already 
had been revoked once for failure to look for work, so he dreamed up a scheme to fake a 
job.”  Id.  The judge apparently didn’t think that the scheme was funny, as he sentenced Dr. 
Brown to three more years in federal prison after revoking his supervised release for giving 
false information to a federal officer.  Id. 
43 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009).  For instance, the maximum 
penalty able to be imposed for a violation of supervised release given for a class A felony is 
a five-year prison term.  Id.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) states the terms for supervised release after 
imprisonment as follows: 
(b) AUTHORIZED TERMS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE.—Except as otherwise 
provided, the authorized terms of supervised release are— 
(1) for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than five years; 
(2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than three years; and 
(3) for a Class E felony, or for a misdemeanor (other than a petty 
offense), not more than one year. 
18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006 & Supp. 2009).  Both supervised release and probation “occur after 
imprisonment, and . . . involve governmental supervision after release.”  United States v. 
Reyes, 48 F.3d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1995).  However, there are at least two important 
differences between supervised release and probation.  Id.  One “is that supervised release 
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From the outset, the United States Sentencing Commission chose to 
promulgate policy statements creating and governing revocations of 
supervised release.44  They did this rather than issuing Sentencing 
Guidelines administering to supervised release because it gave courts 
more flexibility in devising revocation sentences.45  Consequently, 
differing from the Sentencing Guidelines, which were mandatory for the 
sentencing courts (pre-Booker), the policy statements for sentences 
stemming from revocations of supervised release were always purely 
advisory.46  As a result, the Chapter Seven policy statements have always 
                                                                                                             
is a form of post-imprisonment supervision that is in addition to the term of imprisonment, 
while probation is supervision in lieu of incarceration.”  Id. (citation omitted).  This 
difference may change the length of the sentence served.  Id.  The second difference, at least 
in some states, is that “the focus of probation has been shifted from rehabilitation to 
deterrence.”  Id. at 438–39. 
44 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmts. 1, 3(a) (2009). 
45 Id.; see United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 763–66 (8th Cir. 1992).  The Eighth Circuit 
stated that: 
 When Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to formulate 
“[G]uidelines,” it also told the courts to follow the 
[G]uidelines. . . . Congress also provided that an incorrect application 
of the [G]uidelines was grounds for reversal.   
 Congress did not, however, impose the same requirements with 
respect to policy statements.  Although Congress directed the 
Commission to promulgate “general policy statements,” it never stated 
that courts were bound to follow them.  Instead, Congress provided 
that a sentencing court need only “consider” applicable policy 
statements when imposing sentence. . . . Not a single statute states that 
incorrect application of a policy statement is grounds for reversal.  Not 
a single statute states that policy statements must be followed, nor does 
any guideline approved by Congress. . . . In sum, Congress has said 
nothing to indicate that policy statements are anything other than 
advisory. . . .  
 It is plain that Congress has made a clear distinction between 
[G]uidelines, which have the force of law, and policy statements, 
which are only advisory.  There are good reasons for this distinction.  
Guidelines, unlike policy statements, must be submitted to Congress 
before taking effect.  The review procedure applies only to 
[G]uidelines proper, not policy statements.  Congress must have 
deemed it desirable to have a mix of controlling and advisory material 
under the [G]uidelines system, giving the Commission and the courts 
the flexibility required in sentencing. 
Id. at 763–64 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(a) (2009) (stating that the United States 
Sentencing Commission has itself characterized its policy statements as advisory).  For a 
discussion of sentencing discretion after Booker and Gall, see Alan Ellis & James H. 
Feldman, Jr., Feature:  Federal Sentencing Under the Advisory Guidelines:  A Primer for the 
Occasional Federal Practitioner—Part Two, 32 CHAMPION 36, 40 (2008). 
46 See Hall, supra note 10, at 408 (discussing the advisory nature of the policy 
statements); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmts. 
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been more concise and elementary than the Sentencing Guidelines that 
apply to original sentences.47 
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3742:  The Traditional Standard of Review Pre-Booker 
Before 2005, a defendant’s appeal of a revocation of supervised 
release was reviewed under the standard found in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).48  
                                                                                                             
1, 3(a) (2009) (explaining that, from the very beginning, the United States Sentencing 
Commission chose to promulgate policy statements for supervised release rather than 
binding Sentencing Guidelines). 
47 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 1 (2009).  
According to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual: 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(3), the Sentencing Commission is required to 
issue [G]uidelines or policy statements applicable to the revocation of 
probation and supervised release.  At this time, the Commission has 
chosen to promulgate policy statements only.  These policy statements 
will provide guidance while allowing for the identification of any 
substantive or procedural issues that require further review.  The 
Commission views these policy statements as evolutionary and will 
review relevant data and materials concerning revocation 
determinations under these policy statements. 
Id.  Furthermore: 
At the outset, the Commission faced a choice between promulgating 
[G]uidelines or issuing advisory policy statements for the revocation of 
probation and supervised release.  After considered debate and input 
from judges, probation officers, and prosecuting and defense 
attorneys, the Commission decided, for a variety of reasons, initially to 
issue policy statements.  Not only was the policy statement option 
expressly authorized by statute, but this approach provided greater 
flexibility to both the Commission and the courts.  Unlike [G]uidelines, 
policy statements are not subject to the May 1 statutory deadline for 
submission to Congress, and the Commission believed that it would 
benefit from the additional time to consider complex issues relating to 
revocation [G]uidelines provided by the policy statement option.  
Moreover, the Commission anticipates that, because of its greater 
flexibility, the policy statement option will provide better 
opportunities for evaluation by the courts and the Commission.  This 
flexibility is important, given that supervised release as a method of 
post-incarceration supervision and transformation of probation from a 
suspension of sentence to a sentence in itself represent recent changes 
in federal sentencing practices. 
Id. at introductory cmt. 3(a). 
48 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006 & Supp. 2009).  This statute established that the court of 
appeals should decide whether the sentence:  
(1) was imposed in violation of law; 
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the 
[S]entencing [G]uidelines; 
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and 
(A) the district court failed to provide the written statement 
of reasons required by [§] 3553(c); 
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That section also provides for de novo review of the trial court’s decision 
to depart from the policy statements.49  Thus, the traditional standard of 
review utilized by appellate courts in reviewing post-revocation 
sentences was “plainly unreasonable.”50  This is because a violation of 
supervised release is a non-Sentencing Guideline offense (i.e., it falls 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)).51 
B. The “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard and the Aftermath of Booker 
The “plainly unreasonable” standard of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) 
mentioned above was questioned by the landmark case of United States v. 
Booker, which considered the effect of mandatory Sentencing Guidelines 
on defendants’ sentences.52  In Booker, the Supreme Court concluded that 
two decisions—Apprendi53 and Blakely54—applied to the Sentencing 
                                                                                                             
(B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range 
based on a factor that— 
(i) does not advance the objectives set forth in 
[§] 3553(a)(2); or 
(ii) is not authorized under [§] 3553(b); or 
(iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or 
(C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the 
applicable [G]uidelines range, having regard for the factors 
to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in 
[§] 3553(a) of this title and the reasons for the imposition of 
the particular sentence, as stated by the district court 
pursuant to the provisions of [§] 3553(c); or 
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable 
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable. 
Id. 
49 Id. § 3742(e).  It states: 
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the 
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept 
the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly 
erroneous and, except with respect to determinations under subsection 
(3)(A) or (3)(B), shall give due deference to the district court’s 
application of the [G]uidelines to the facts.  With respect to 
determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals 
shall review de novo the district court’s application of the [G]uidelines 
to the facts. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
50 See Hall, supra note 10, at 408 (explaining the split among the circuits after Booker). 
51 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); see Hall, supra note 10, at 408 (expounding on this statement and 
noting that it is an offense governed by policy statements). 
52 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
53 In Apprendi, the Court found that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “any fact [other than a prior conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
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Guidelines and that, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) were unconstitutional.55  
The five-to-four Booker decision rendered two idiosyncratic opinions 
addressing overlapping constitutional issues:  (1) whether the mandatory 
Sentencing Guidelines set out in the SRA violated defendants’ right to a 
jury under the Sixth Amendment; and (2) if the Sentencing Guidelines 
infringed those rights, whether the Court should invalidate the entire 
SRA.56  The substantive constitutional opinion delivered by Justice 
Stevens addressed the first of the above questions.57  He explained, 
reminiscent of Apprendi, that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) 
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum 
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict 
                                                                                                             
54 In invalidating a petitioner’s sentence, the Blakely Court found that Washington’s 
sentencing procedure did not comply with the Sixth Amendment, consistent with its 
holding in Apprendi.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).  “Our precedents 
make clear . . . that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or 
admitted by the defendant.”  Id.  Ultimately, “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he 
may impose without any additional findings.”  Id. at 303–04.  A judge exceeds his proper 
authority if he “inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow [because] 
the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment . . . .’”  
Id. 
55 Booker, 543 U.S. at 220.  The Sentencing Guidelines were, in effect, only advisory.  Id.  
Trial courts were required to take the Sentencing Guidelines into consideration but were 
not bound by them.  Id.  Review of sentencing determinations was thus to be subjected to a 
“reasonableness” standard.  Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (delineating the rights of 
defendants in these types of situations). 
56 See Hall, supra note 10, at 409 (explaining that the Booker Court handed down a split-
decision—with the first opinion addressing whether the application of the Guidelines was 
violative of the Sixth Amendment, and the second dealing with how to remedy the Sixth 
Amendment infringement found by the Court); see also United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 
575 (6th Cir. 2007) (delineating a case where a defendant challenged, on “reasonableness” 
grounds, the sentence imposed following the trial court’s revocation of the defendant’s 
four-year period of supervised release). 
57 Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. 
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in part, in which Scalia, 
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., delivered the 
opinion of the Court in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.  Stevens, J., filed an opinion 
dissenting in part, in which Souter, J., joined, and in which Scalia, J., 
joined except for Part III and footnote 17, and Thomas, J., filed 
opinions dissenting in part.  Breyer, J., filed an opinion dissenting in 
part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined. 
Id. at 225 (citations omitted). 
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must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”58 
Justice Breyer concentrated on the second question in a separate 
remedial opinion, where he declared that two provisions, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e),59 must be severed and deleted to 
implement the constitutional holding.60  The Court made clear that 
instead of applying the de novo standard of review found in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(e), appellate courts needed to apply the recognizable standard of 
“reasonableness.”61  “Reasonableness” was the standard administered to 
Sentencing Guideline departures until 2003, when Congress substituted 
the de novo standard.62  However, the Court did not spell out whether, by 
excising 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), it meant to alter the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard of review used for sentences with no applicable Sentencing 
Guidelines, including sentences for violations of supervised release.63 
Soon after the decision was handed down, defendants appealing 
revocations of supervised release began to assert that the Booker 
“reasonableness” standard of review had replaced the more deferential 
standard of “plainly unreasonable.”64  The split among the circuits 
                                                 
58 See id. at 244 (reaffirming the Court’s holding in Apprendi and applying Blakely to the 
Sentencing Guidelines); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 (holding that it was unconstitutional to 
take from the jury the appraisal of facts that increased the prescribed range of penalties to 
which the petitioner was subjected); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313–14 (finding that the jury’s 
verdict alone did not authorize the sentence and so the sentencing procedure did not 
comply with the Sixth Amendment). 
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (providing the provision making 
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006 Supp.). 
60 Booker, 543 U.S. at 244–45; see Leigha Simonton, Booker’s Impact on the Standard of 
Review Governing Supervised Release and Probation Revocation Sentences, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. 
L. 129, 136 (2006) (quoting Booker and discussing the excision of the unconstitutional 
portions of the Sentencing Guidelines, as well as the ruling’s impact on supervised release 
appeals).  But see Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1950 n.26 (1997) 
(relating that courts can sever uses or portions of a statute that are decidedly 
unconstitutional or wrong from applications that are valid and can continue to apply the 
constitutional or lawful portions), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 247. 
61 Simonton, supra note 60, at 136. 
62 Id.  “In 2003, Congress modified the pre-existing text [of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)], adding a 
de novo standard of review for departures and inserting cross-references to [18 U.S.C.] 
§ 3553(b)(1).”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 
63 Simonton, supra note 60, at 136; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (giving the rights to 
defendants, which the Booker Court announced were violated by mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (codifying the Sentencing Guidelines). 
64 Simonton, supra note 60, at 136; see Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, “Consulting” the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1516 (2006) (reading 
Booker to create an egalitarian sentencing system whereby all sentences are governed by 
advisory Sentencing Guidelines and judged by the same appellate standard of review); see 
also JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:  CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss1/9
2011] Circuit Circus 323 
regarding the correct standard of review in supervised release revocation 
cases was a direct outgrowth of the confusion spawned by Booker.65 
Since Booker, ten circuits have confronted which standard to use in 
reviewing appeals of sentences imposed post-revocation.66  Nine of these 
ten circuits have taken a stance on the issue, with the Fifth Circuit being 
the only one to remain undecided.67  When analyzing this issue, the 
courts have generally confronted two broad questions:  (1) whether, by 
announcing a standard of “unreasonableness” review in Booker, the 
Supreme Court had meant to replace the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard; and (2) whether there is any real distinction between these 
standards.68  The circuits’ answers to these questions follow. 
C. The “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard 
When faced with appellate cases post-Booker, only two circuits have 
held that the “plainly unreasonable” standard of review has survived 
Booker.69  The Fourth and the Seventh Circuits have announced that the 
two standards, though similar, are not factually the same.70  They have 
also concluded that Booker did not displace the traditional “plainly 
unreasonable” standard of review applied to post-revocation sentences 
in favor of another standard.71 
The decisive case addressing the proper standard of review for post-
revocation sentencing in the Fourth Circuit is United States v. Crudup.72  
                                                                                                             
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 53–54 (2003) (evidencing an emerging egalitarian 
approach). 
65 See Hall, supra note 10, at 410 (discussing the resulting split among the circuits). 
66 See id. at 410–11 (including all of the circuits except for the First, the D.C., and the 
Federal). 
67 See United States v. Breland, 647 F.3d 284, 286–87 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) 
(“We will affirm a sentence of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised 
release unless it is ‘unreasonable’ or ‘plainly unreasonable.’ We have not yet decided which 
of the above standards of review apply in the wake of Booker, and we decline to do so 
today . . . .”); United States v. Smith, 255 F. App’x 867, 868 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) 
(“This court has yet to decide which standard of review is applicable to revocation 
sentences.  We decline to address this issue now as Smith’s argument fails under both the 
‘reasonable’ and the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standards of review.”); United States v. Jones, 
484 F.3d 783, 791–92 (5th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that there is a split among the circuits 
regarding the standard of review for revocation of supervised release sentences and 
declining to reach the issue). 
68 Hall, supra note 10, at 411. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 461 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006).  In Crudup, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reviewed a district court decision in which a defendant was sentenced to a thirty-six month 
term of imprisonment after his supervised release sentence was revoked.  Id. at 434–35.  
The defendant claimed that the length of his revocation sentence was “plainly 
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Though acknowledging the dissimilar position taken by many of its 
fellow circuits, the Fourth Circuit relied on implications derived from the 
language and structure of portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 not stricken by 
Booker to conclude that the “plainly unreasonable” standard had 
survived.73  The court inferred from 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4) 
that the proper standard was “plainly unreasonable.”74  It stated that “[i]t 
would seem incongruous that a defendant limited to asserting that his 
revocation sentence is ‘plainly unreasonable,’ would be allowed to argue 
that his sentence should be reversed because it is ‘unreasonable.’”75  
Employing Sentencing Guidelines commentary and statutory provisions, 
the court distinguished revocation sentences from original sentences and 
suggested that the deviations perhaps warranted different standards of 
review, “reasonableness” for original sentences and “plainly 
unreasonable” for revocation sentences.76 
The Fourth Circuit subsequently addressed whether there was any 
actual difference between the two standards, finding them to be similar 
though not identical, and concluding that Congress distinguished the 
two expressions.77  The appellate court then gave its definition of the 
“plainly unreasonable” standard.78   According to the Fourth Circuit, the 
first step in the review process is to determine if the original sentence is 
                                                                                                             
unreasonable” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4).  Id. at 435.  After reviewing the structure 
of § 3742 and interrelated statutory and guideline provisions, the court held that revocation 
sentences should be reviewed under a “plainly unreasonable” standard using the 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) factors.  Id. at 439.  Deciding that the defendant’s sentence was not “plainly 
unreasonable,” the court affirmed.  Id. at 440; see United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 
656 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing the holding in Crudup). 
73 See Hall, supra note 10, at 411 (explaining that the Fourth Circuit rejected the adoption 
of a “reasonableness” standard). 
74 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006 & Supp. 2009).  Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) states:  “A 
defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final 
sentence if the sentence . . . (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no 
[S]entencing [G]uideline and is plainly unreasonable.”  Id. § 3742(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) 
states:  “The Government may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an 
otherwise final sentence if the sentence . . . (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is 
no [S]entencing [G]uideline and is plainly unreasonable.”  18 U.S.C. § 3742(b); see Hall, 
supra note 10, at 411–12 (noting that § (b)(4) “also mandates the ‘plainly unreasonable’ 
standard for similar appeals by the government”); see also Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438 (noting 
flaws with the “reasonableness” standard). 
75 Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437. 
76 Id. 
77 See id. at 438.  The Fourth Circuit held that “Congress used both terms—
‘unreasonable’ and ‘plainly unreasonable’—in [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e), the standard of review 
section that Booker excised.”  Id.  As “there is no indication that Congress intended the word 
‘plainly’ to be surplusage, the best interpretation of these two terms in their context is that 
they are not coterminous.”  Id. 
78 Simonton, supra note 60, at 151. 
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“unreasonable.”79  If not, the sentence should be affirmed; but, if the 
sentence is “unreasonable,” the court must resolve whether it is 
“plainly” so, using the same definition of “plain” utilized in the plain 
error analysis.80 
After refusing to answer the question of which standard was correct 
in United States v. Rush and United States v. Flagg (likely hoping that the 
other circuits or the Supreme Court would sort out the issue in the 
interim), the Seventh Circuit decided to preserve the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard of review for revocations of supervised release 
in United States v. Kizeart.81  Like the Fourth Circuit in Crudup, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noticed that the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard existed in statutory text other than the portions 
excised by Booker.82  The court reasoned, “[w]e are not disregarding a 
Supreme Court dictum . . . for apart from the omission of a reference to 
subsection (e)(4), there is nothing . . . to suggest that the [Booker] Court 
was altering the statutory standard of appellate review of sentences for 
                                                 
79 Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438. 
80 Id. at 439.  Hence, for purposes of deciding whether an unreasonable sentence is 
plainly unreasonable, “[p]lain is synonymous with clear or, equivalently, obvious.”  Id. at 
439 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81 See United States v. Flagg, 481 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We have not squarely 
addressed this issue and need not resolve it today as we conclude that Flagg’s sentence is 
appropriate regardless of whether we review it under the ‘plainly unreasonable’ 
standard . . . or the reasonableness standard . . . .”); United States v. Rush, 132 F. App’x 54, 
56 (7th Cir. 2005).  In Rush, the court stated: 
[C]ounsel considers whether Rush might argue that his new term of 
imprisonment is not “reasonable” under United States v. Booker.  It is 
not clear that Booker requires any change in our evaluation of prison 
terms imposed upon revocation of supervised release, since the 
revocation policy statements have always been advisory only.  Two of 
our sister circuits have concluded that Booker replaced the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard we formerly applied with its new 
“reasonableness” standard, [referring to United States v. Fleming in the 
Second Circuit and United States v. Edwards in the Eighth Circuit], but 
even if the two formulations are qualitatively different we would not 
find error under either. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 673 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that the defendant violated his supervised release by committing a felony).  The 
only issue raised by counsel on appeal was whether Booker had altered the standard of 
review for sentences imposed post-revocation of supervised release, i.e., whether Booker 
changed the standard from “plainly unreasonable” to “reasonableness.”  Id.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that although Booker invalidated 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(e), it did not directly address § 3742(e)(4), the portion providing that post-revocation 
sentences dealing with supervised release could be reversed only if they were “plainly 
unreasonable.”  Id. at 675. 
82 Hall, supra note 10, at 412.  The author explains that the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard existed in parts of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 not touched by Booker.  Id. 
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violating conditions of supervised release.”83  The court also focused on 
the use of the plural form of the word “standards” referenced by the 
Booker Court (i.e., at least two—“plainly unreasonable” and 
“reasonableness”).84  Concluding that nothing suggested that the 
Supreme Court had aimed to merge the two standards mentioned in 
Booker, the Seventh Circuit decided that “plainly unreasonable” was the 
correct standard of review for cases without applicable Sentencing 
Guidelines, including revocations of supervised release.85 
The Seventh Circuit, while recognizing that the difference between 
the two standards is marginal, referenced Crudup, acknowledging that 
“the courts must respect Congress’s wish to curtail appellate review of 
non-[G]uidelines sentences particularly sharply, and so must seek to give 
meaning to the difference between ‘unreasonable’ and ‘plainly 
unreasonable.’”86  One basis mentioned by the Seventh Circuit for why a 
more limited scope of review is apt for non-Guidelines sentences is that 
the United States Sentencing Commission’s decision not to issue 
                                                 
83 Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 674 (declining to adopt a new standard post-Booker for revocations 
of supervised release).  “We shall therefore adhere to our [earlier] ruling[s] . . .  requiring 
that a defendant who challenges his sentence for violating supervised release show that the 
sentence is plainly unreasonable.”  Id. 
84 Id. (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 262) (internal citations omitted) (providing that the 
Kizeart court stated that “reasonableness standards [not standard] are not foreign to 
sentencing law”). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (citing United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437–39 (4th Cir. 2006)); see id. at 674–
75 (approving Crudup’s stance); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (noting 
that it is a fundamental tenant of statutory construction that a statute should not be 
interpreted so as to render language within it superfluous); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 
U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994) (observing that language in statutes should not be construed so as to 
render any part mere surplus); Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 833 (1983) (“[T]he 
settled principle of statutory construction [is] that we must give effect . . . to every word of 
the statute.”); Sch. Dist. of Wisconsin Dells v. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Aegerter v. City of Delafield, 174 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1999)) (stating that “‘it is 
possible, though not always easy,’ to distinguish among the canonical standards of review 
and acknowledging the ‘skepticism’ which has emerged ‘in the past about the ability of 
judges to apply more than a few standards of review’”).  The canon of construction and 
interpretation, which directs the courts to give full effect to every word in a statute so long 
as it does not render it contradictory proves that it is not up to the courts to disregard 
language inserted by the legislature and left intact after Booker.  YULE KIM, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT 
TRENDS 4 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.  “A basic 
principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should ‘give effect, if possible, to every 
clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the 
legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.’”  Id. at 12.  The 
modern version of this “is that statutes should be construed ‘so as to avoid rendering 
superfluous’ any statutory language.”  Id.; see also infra Part III.A.3 (discussing canons of 
construction). 
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Sentencing Guidelines in this area connotes that the district courts 
should have more flexibility in sentencing.87  Thus, a short maximum 
prison term penalty for supervised release violations means that there is 
less at stake, demanding fewer strata of judicial review crucial to 
satisfying the constitutional necessities of due process of law.88 
Judge Posner, writing for the court, noted that appellate courts can 
comprehend and apply the differences between deferential and 
nondeferential standards.89  However, “the making of finer gradations 
within the category of deferential review strains judicial 
competence . . . .”90  Though the tiers exist in a formal nature, in most 
cases, appellate courts recognize that the level of deference given to the 
trial court depends less on the announced official standard than on the 
nature of the question.91  The perceived competence of the district court 
in the eyes of the appellate court comes into play as well.92  Kizeart relates 
that while courts do their best to observe any gradations Congress 
mandates, they cannot assure immense success in the undertaking.93 
                                                 
87 Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675. 
88 Id.; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (explaining that courts consider 
“the degree of potential deprivation” caused by an administrative adjudication when 
determining whether the decision-making process violated the plaintiff’s due process 
rights). 
89 Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675.  Using judicial review of sanctions imposed by prison 
disciplinary boards, the court analogized the “plainly unreasonable” standard to the 
standard used in those cases and provided several example cases to emphasize its point.  
Id.; see Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–57 (1985) (stating “[r]equiring a modicum of 
evidence to support” the prison disciplinary board’s decision and “the requirements of due 
process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary 
board to revoke good time credits,” and “any evidence” or “meager” evidence will do); 
Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that while “‘some 
evidence’ . . . must bear some indicia of reliability . . . [it need only cross a] meager 
threshold.”); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations 
omitted) (noting “some evidence in the record,” “any evidence,” “a modicum of evidence,” 
“meager proof will suffice,” “not much” evidence, but the evidence “must point to the 
accused’s guilt” through this “lenient standard” of review). 
90 Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675. 
91 Id. 
92 See id. (stating that, “in most cases, . . . appellate judges are merely giving the benefit 
of the doubt to the trier of fact . . . [which] depends . . . [in part on] the institutional 
competence of the first-level decision maker relative to that of the appellate court”). 
93 Id.; see Timothy J. Storm, The Standard of Review Does Matter:  Evidence of Judicial Self-
Restraint in the Illinois Appellate Court, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73, 89 (2009) (stating that while all of 
the different standards of review are stated and seemingly defined with time-honored 
words, many of those standards use undefined words to define their own expressions).  “If 
the standard to be achieved is consistency of outcome, then more than mere consistency of 
definition is required for the standards of review to serve their intended function of 
maintaining the proper relationship between trial courts and appellate courts.”  Id. at 90.  It 
follows that courts must therefore apply a consistent amount of deference to the trial 
court’s decision under each standard.  Id.  “Because that sort of consistency is unlikely to be 
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D. The “Reasonableness” Standard 
The second major approach is one of “reasonableness.”  Yet, among 
the circuits that have chosen “reasonableness” as their standard for 
reviewing post-revocation sentences, there is an additional split.94  Some 
circuits have chosen the “reasonableness” standard, yet believe that there 
is no difference between the “plainly unreasonable” and the 
“reasonableness” standards.95  Other circuits have taken the opposite 
stance, finding that “reasonableness” is the correct standard, yet 
differentiate between it and “plainly unreasonable.”96  A detailed 
explanation of this split within a circuit split follows. 
1. Following the “Reasonableness” Approach:  Finding No Difference 
Between the “Plainly Unreasonable” and “Reasonableness” 
Standards 
The Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that 
Booker’s “reasonableness” standard of review is equivalent to the 
“plainly unreasonable” standard, though they have announced 
“reasonableness” as their official test.97  After deciding that Booker had 
not changed the standard of review for post-revocation sentences, these 
circuits have applied the “reasonableness” standard because, in their 
estimate, it was the same one that had been utilized before Booker.98  In 
reaching the aforementioned conclusion, these four circuits looked to an 
excerpt from Booker, which explained that “reasonableness” standards 
were not alien to sentencing law.99  As illustrations for this position, the 
                                                                                                             
achieved through the usual route of judicial review, the onus lies upon the individual 
appellate court . . . to remain faithful to the spirit of the appropriate standard of review in 
working through the decision-making process.”  Id.  Consequently, “the standard of review 
is effective as a limitation on judicial power only to the extent that reviewing courts 
consistently interpret the scope of review available under each standard and abide by that 
limitation in deciding cases.”  Id. 
94 See infra Part II.D.1–2 (discussing the internal split among the circuits subscribing to 
“reasonableness”). 
95 See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the circuits that follow a “reasonableness” approach 
yet find no difference between the two standards). 
96 See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the circuits that follow a “reasonableness” approach 
while finding a difference between the two standards). 
97 Simonton, supra note 60, at 136. 
98 Hall, supra note 10, at 414. 
99 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005).  The Booker majority stated that 
“‘[r]easonableness’ standards are not foreign to sentencing law.  The [SRA] has long 
required their use in important sentencing circumstances—both on review of departures, 
and on review of sentences imposed where there was no applicable [Sentencing] Guideline.  
Together, these cases account for about 16.7% of sentencing appeals.”  Id. (citations 
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Supreme Court cited several cases in which the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard was used.100  Accordingly, the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits viewed this as an endorsement of the appropriate standard to be 
used.101 
While the Sixth Circuit questioned the foundation of the 
“reasonableness” standard, it remained ambivalent regarding the proper 
standard applicable to supervised release revocation appeals until its 
determination to recognize the “reasonableness” standard in United 
States v. Bolds.102  First, the appellate court looked to the intent of the 
Supreme Court in Booker and subsequent cases.103  In Bolds, the Sixth 
Circuit used two decisions that had recently been handed down by the 
                                                                                                             
omitted).  The Booker Court then went on to list several examples of cases to further its 
point.  Id. 
100 See id. at 262 (citing several cases that used the “plainly unreasonable” standard); see 
also United States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to sentence defendants to longer terms than 
suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines and that the defendants were not entitled to notice 
that the district court was contemplating a sentence outside the Sentencing Guidelines 
range because Chapter Seven policy statements were not binding and the revocation 
sentences outside their ranges were not departures); United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 
1218 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the trial court did not err in considering the special 
medicinal and correctional needs of the defendant in determining how much time the 
defendant should be required to serve in prison after he failed to abide by the conditions of 
his supervised release); United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming 
a district court’s revocation of the defendant’s supervised release and imposition of a 
twenty-four month prison term after he violated the terms of his release on multiple 
occasions and finding that the trial court’s decision was not “plainly unreasonable”); 
United States v. Cook, 291 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (finding that under 
the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2), as amended, the court was authorized to re-
sentence the defendant for violating probation without being restricted to the guideline 
range applicable at the time of the initial sentencing hearing); United States v. Olabanji, 268 
F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court erred by failing to consider the 
range applicable to the underlying offense after rejecting the range prescribed by the policy 
statement, and reversing and directing the trial court to consider the Sentencing Guidelines 
range for the underlying offense as part of the calculus for imposing an appropriate term of 
incarceration); United States v. Ramirez-Rivera, 241 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that 
the trial court’s revocation sentence was not an abuse of discretion and that, even though it 
was outside the Sentencing Guidelines range, it was within the statutory range). 
101 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 262 (listing cases from these circuits that used the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard). 
102 511 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2007).  In Bolds, a defendant appealed the decision of the district 
court challenging, on “reasonableness” grounds, the sentence imposed following the trial 
court’s revocation of the defendant’s four-year period of supervised release.  Id. at 570; see 
United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816–17 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “Booker left 
[18 U.S.C. §§] 3742(a), 3742(b), and 3742(f) on the books, and . . . our cases have relied upon 
both [§§] 3742(a)(4) and 3742(e)(4) in applying a ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard. . . . These 
sections, by themselves, give us pause about accepting the Second Circuit’s approach”). 
103 Bolds, 511 F.3d at 574; see Hall, supra note 10, at 416 (explaining the Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis). 
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Supreme Court—Rita v. United States and Gall v. United States—in 
resolving the question.104  The Sixth Circuit used these two cases to plug 
the voids left by Booker.105  From this standpoint, the Booker Court had 
not created a new standard of review for supervised release revocation 
sentences.106  In its estimation, the Supreme Court had, in actuality, 
directed appellate courts to employ the unchanged “reasonableness” 
standard in their review of all sentences—Guidelines and non-
Guidelines.107  Hence, a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, for 
reasonableness,” is the Sixth Circuit’s current standard.108 
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion discussed the fact that the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard existed in portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 that had 
not been excised by Booker.109  The court also dealt with whether the 
Supreme Court had intended to replace the former “plainly 
unreasonable” standard with one of “reasonableness” by exploring the 
positions taken by other circuits.110  The court found virtue in an 
argument made by the Seventh Circuit in Kizeart:  the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard was not the focus of the Supreme Court’s 
attention in Booker because the advisory policy statements governing 
supervised release were not repugnant to the Constitution.111  After 
                                                 
104 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (holding that the lower appellate 
court correctly applied a presumption of reasonableness to the defendant’s sentence, which 
was within the Sentencing Guidelines, and that the appellate court’s reasoning adequately 
indicated that defendant’s arguments for a lower sentence were taken into consideration 
and rejected); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (holding that although the Court 
stated that appellate courts could consider the extent of a deviation and degree of variance 
from the Sentencing Guidelines, that the court of appeals had erred in requiring 
“extraordinary” circumstances for such deviation); Bolds, 511 F.3d at 568; see also Hall, supra 
note 10, at 416–17 (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Bolds). 
105 Hall, supra note 10, at 418.  Although neither Rita nor Gall grappled with an appeal of 
a post-revocation sentence, “both cases recognized the confusion and discord displayed by 
the circuit courts when reviewing sentencing appeals.”  Id.  Rita shed some light on the 
Supreme Court’s intent in Booker, while “Gall helped clarify appellate court confusion.”  Id. 
at 419.  The Gall Court stated that, because “the Guidelines are now advisory, and appellate 
review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are 
‘reasonable[,]’ . . . the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to 
appellate review of sentencing decisions.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. 
106 Bolds, 511 F.3d at 575. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 578 (internal citations omitted). 
109 Hall, supra note 10, at 417.  “[T]he court seemingly agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s 
analysis in Crudup that the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard of review had not been 
displaced by Booker.”  Id. 
110 Id. 
111 United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Booker).  “The Sixth 
Circuit also looked at the fact that Booker cited several cases that had used the ‘plainly 
unreasonable’ standard as examples of the proper standard of review, which was the basis 
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shifting its attention to discern whether there really was a discrepancy 
between the two standards and failing, the court concluded that, 
although the Booker Court did not exactly excise the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4), 
there is no sensible distinction between Booker’s “reasonableness” and 
the “plainly unreasonable” standard in §§ 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4).112 
United States v. Edwards, United States v. Cotton, and United States v. 
Tyson make it apparent that the Eighth Circuit subscribes to the 
“reasonableness” standard of review; yet, in these cases, the court found 
no concrete variations between the standards.113  In United States v. 
Cotton, the Eighth Circuit held that the pre-Booker standard of review for 
supervised release revocations was neither substituted nor discarded in 
Booker; rather, it found that the post-Booker standard was equivalent to 
the “plainly unreasonable” standard.114  The Cotton court reached this 
                                                                                                             
for the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions.”  Hall, supra note 10, at 417 
(footnotes omitted). 
112 Bolds, 511 F.3d at 575; see 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (recording the language 
at issue). 
113 United States v. Edwards, 400 F.3d 591, 592–93 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curium).  In 
Edwards, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s determination, holding that, given the 
defendant’s admission to violating the terms of his release by unlawfully using a controlled 
substance, the trial court had not committed clear error in the findings of fact supporting 
the revocation, nor had it abused its discretion in the decision to revoke his supervised 
release.  Id. at 592.  The appellate court also stated that, while Booker significantly changed 
the state of federal sentencing, its effect on post-revocation sentences imposed for 
violations of supervised release was far less dramatic.  Id.  The Sentencing Guidelines 
associated with supervised release violations were considered advisory even before Booker.  
Id.  The appellate court determined that the trial court’s sentence was not “unreasonable.”  
Id. at 593; United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2005).  In Cotton, a defendant 
appealed from an order sentencing her to forty-six months of imprisonment upon 
revocation of her term of supervised release for possessing and using controlled 
substances.  Cotton, 399 F.3d at 914.  The defendant entered into a plea agreement, making 
the basis for revoking supervised release a Grade C violation, the recommended sentence 
for which was seven to thirteen months of imprisonment; she was later sentenced to forty-
six months.  Id. at 915.  The appellate court determined that the sentence imposed was not 
“unreasonable” as the district court discussed the statutory sentencing goals and gave 
multiple satisfactory reasons for its sentence.  Id. at 915–17; United States v. Tyson, 413 F.3d 
824, 826 (8th Cir. 2005).  In Tyson, a defendant appealed from a trial court decision revoking 
his probation and imposing a sentence of fifteen months of imprisonment and three years 
of supervised release on the ground that he had violated its terms by using cocaine, 
assaulting his fiancée, and failing to report to his probation officer.  Tyson, 413 F.3d at 825.  
The appellate court noted that prior to Booker, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4) provided that the court 
was to determine whether the sentence imposed was “plainly unreasonable.”  Id.  
However, the court concluded that Booker had excised § 3742(e) and directed that 
sentencing decisions should be reviewed for “reasonableness.”  Id.  The appellate court 
then went on to conclude that the defendant’s sentence was not “unreasonable.”  Id. at 826. 
114 See Hall, supra note 10, at 415 (discussing that the Eighth Circuit concluded that Booker 
had not altered the standard used for review of revocations of supervised release). 
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decision by referencing Booker’s citation to an Eighth Circuit case, United 
States v. White Face, as an illustration of an appellate court’s capacity to 
apply the “reasonableness” standard.115  Using the standard advanced in 
Booker, the Eighth Circuit in Cotton found that the “reasonableness” 
standard was the same as the standard of review set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(e)(4).116  The court declared that the new standard was, in reality, 
the same as the one they would have used otherwise.117 
United States v. Tedford established that the Tenth Circuit’s current 
standard of review is “reasonableness.”118  The Tedford court agreed with 
the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Cotton, “that Booker did not change the 
‘plainly unreasonable’ standard of review.”119  The court held that when 
a trial court imposes a sentence in surfeit of that recommended by the 
Chapter Seven policy statements of the Sentencing Guidelines manual, 
the sentence shall be affirmed if it was “‘reasoned and reasonable.’”120  
Similar to the logic employed by the Cotton court (using White Face), the 
Tenth Circuit utilized United States v. Tsosie in its analysis.121 
The Eleventh Circuit followed the path laid by the Second, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits in deciding United States v. Sweeting and in adopting 
the “reasonableness” standard of review.122  Even though, pre-Booker, the 
Eleventh Circuit had reviewed supervised release revocation sentences 
under the “plainly unreasonable” standard of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4), the 
court determined that, post-Booker, the proper standard was one of 
“reasonableness.”123  Using Tedford and Cotton as examples, the Eleventh 
Circuit chose its side—Booker had similarly held out a 2002 Eleventh 
                                                 
115 United States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733, 737–40 (8th Cir. 2004), cited in Booker, 543 
U.S. at 262; see Cotton, 399 F.3d at 916 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 262).  White Face involved a 
post-revocation appeal and was decided by the Eighth Circuit in 2004, “when ‘plainly 
unreasonable’ was the unquestioned standard of review.”  Hall, supra note 10, at 415. 
116 Cotton, 399 F.3d at 916. 
117 Id. 
118 405 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2005).  The defendant in Tedford was sentenced to thirty-six 
months of incarceration and a subsequent sixty-month period of supervised release.  Id. at 
1160.  Upon revocation of the supervised release, the trial court imposed a sentence of 
forty-eight months of incarceration.  Id.  The defendant appealed the sentence, contending 
that her sentence was “unreasonable” because the district court did not adequately 
consider the Chapter Seven policy statements of the Guidelines.  Id.; see Hall, supra note 10, 
at 415 (discussing Tedford). 
119 Hall, supra note 10, at 415. 
120 Tedford, 405 F.3d at 1161. 
121 United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 262; 
see Tedford, 405 F.3d at 1161 (deciding to follow the standard articulated by Tsosie).  “In 
Booker, the Supreme Court cited United States v. Tsosie, a pre-Booker supervised release 
revocation appeal in the Tenth Circuit, as an example of the ‘reasonableness’ standard.”  
Hall, supra note 10, at 416. 
122 437 F.3d 1105, 1105–07 (11th Cir. 2006). 
123 Id. at 1106–07. 
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Circuit decision, United States v. Cook, as an example of the appropriate 
standard of review for cases involving supervised release revocation 
sentences.124 
2. Following the “Reasonableness” Approach:  Finding a Difference 
between the “Plainly Unreasonable” and “Reasonableness” 
Standards 
Though also choosing to use the “reasonableness” standard of 
review, the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have implicitly held that 
the standards are different.125  While avoiding discussion of the 
similarities and variations in the standards, these three circuits have held 
that the “reasonableness” standard replaced the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard formerly found in § 3742(e)(4).126 
Days after Booker was decided, the Second Circuit made its stance 
known in United States v. Fleming.127  The Fleming Court reasoned that 
§§ 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4), containing “plainly unreasonable” language, 
were not touched by Booker.128  Yet, the Second Circuit held that once the 
Supreme Court expunged § 3742(e), it “is fairly understood as requiring 
that its announced standard of reasonableness [is] now [to] be applied 
not only to [the] review of sentences for which there are [G]uidelines but 
also to review of sentences for which there are no applicable 
[G]uidelines.”129  The court explained that “reasonableness” is an elastic 
notion, and remarked that appellate courts “should exhibit restraint, not 
micromanagement” when reviewing post-revocation sentencing 
                                                 
124 United States v. Cook, 291 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2002), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 262.  In 
Cook, a defendant appealed her sentence of twenty-four months in prison, imposed by the 
district court after her probation was revoked.  Id. at 1298.  She argued that the sentence 
exceeded both her initial sentencing range and the range in the Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. 
at 1299.  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that under the 
plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2), as amended, the trial court had the authority to re-
sentence her for violating probation without being restricted to the guideline range 
applicable at the time of the initial sentencing hearing.  Id. at 1299–1302.  The trial court 
instead must only comply with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559.  Id. at 1302–03; see Hall, supra note 
10, at 416 (expounding on Cook). 
125 Simonton, supra note 60, at 136–37. 
126 Hall, supra note 10, at 413. 
127 397 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2005).  In Fleming, a defendant appealed a judgment of the district 
court sentencing him to two years of imprisonment for his third violation of the conditions 
of his term of supervised release.  Id. at 96.  The court found no error and that the sentence 
was “reasonable.”  Id. 
128 Id. at 99. 
129 Id. 
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appeals.130  The Second Circuit further solidified its position in a later 
case, United States v. Lewis.131 
Without adding much to the analysis used by the Second Circuit in 
Fleming, the Third and Ninth Circuits followed suit.132  In the germinal 
case of United States v. Bungar,133 the Third Circuit held that the proper 
standard of review for sentences imposed for violations of supervised 
release in its jurisdiction is “reasonableness.”134  In deciding the case in 
this manner, the court cited numerous other jurisdictions that had 
reached the same conclusion regarding the proper standard.135 
In United States v. Miqbel,136 the Ninth Circuit held that, following 
Booker, the relevant standard is “reasonableness.”137  The Ninth Circuit 
also adopted the reasoning the Second Circuit had used in Fleming 
without significant elaboration.138  Miqbel stated, “[this circuit] join[s] the 
[United States Courts of Appeals for the] Second and Eighth Circuits in 
concluding that Booker’s ‘reasonableness’ standard has displaced the 
former ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard in the context of revocation 
sentencing.”139  Thus, the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have 
implicitly recognized a distinction between the “reasonable” and 
                                                 
130 Id. at 100. 
131 424 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2005).  In Lewis, a defendant “pleaded guilty to the three charges 
of violating her supervised release.”  Id. at 242.  In response, the district court revoked her 
supervised release term and sentenced her principally to a term of imprisonment of 
twenty-four months.  Id. at 241.  She appealed, asserting that remand was required because 
the sentence was “plainly unreasonable.”  Id.  The appellate court stated that, after Booker, 
the standard for reviewing sentences imposed for violations of supervised release was that 
of “reasonableness.”  Id. at 242; see United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(discussing sentencing under policy statements versus under Sentencing Guidelines). 
132 Hall, supra note 10, at 414. 
133 478 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2007).  In Bungar, a trial court found the defendant guilty of a 
violation of the conditions of his supervised release.  Id. at 541.  He appealed after the 
revocation, contending that the subsequently imposed sixty-month prison term was 
“unreasonable.”  Id.; see United States v. Smith, 419 Fed. App’x 200, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(following Bungar). 
134 Bungar, 478 F.3d at 541.  “The dust has settled, post-Booker, and it is now well 
understood that an appellate court reviews a sentence for reasonableness with regard to the 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  Id. at 542 (citations omitted).  The court saw “no 
reason why that standard should not also apply to a sentence imposed upon a revocation 
of supervised release . . . .”  Id. 
135 Id. at 542 n.1. 
136 444 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2006).  In Miqbel, a defendant pleaded guilty to violating four 
conditions of his term of supervised release.  Id. at 1174.  The court revoked his supervised 
release and imposed the statutory maximum term.  Id.  The defendant appealed, arguing 
that the sentence was “unreasonable.”  Id. 
137 Id. at 1176 n.5. 
138 Simonton, supra note 60, at 140. 
139 Miqbel, 444 F.3d at 1176 n.5. 
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“plainly unreasonable” standards but have concluded that Booker 
anticipated that the former would replace the latter standard.140 
Consequently, the circuits are divided both in their postures and in 
their ideologies.141  There are inherent strengths and weaknesses in each 
stance, but it is important for the judiciary to choose a consistent 
standard so that it may be applied in a uniform way to all defendants.142  
Against the backdrop of the origin of supervised release, the pre-Booker 
standard, and the post-Booker confusion, the following analysis 
scrutinizes the positions taken at the appellate level as to what Booker 
means for defendants like Luci appealing revocations of supervised 
release.143 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Part III primarily focuses on the activity that has taken place within 
the circuits post-Booker.  It also delves into some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the differing stances and answers whether any 
subsequent Supreme Court cases have shed light on what the Supreme 
Court views to be the correct standard.  Part III.A explains why the 
“plainly unreasonable” standard is the correct one and attempts to 
provide a resolution of potential criticisms of this standard.144  It also 
reveals that some of the courts that have chosen “reasonableness” as 
their standard have employed logical flaws in their analysis of Booker.145  
Part III.A also exposes why the differences between policy statements 
and Sentencing Guidelines make a difference in the analysis.146  It further 
investigates the topic using canons of construction and statutory 
schematics.147  Part III.B asks whether the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard survived Booker.148  It also discusses the ease of severability of 
                                                 
140 Id. 
141 See supra Part II.C–D (detailing both the “plainly unreasonable” and the 
“reasonableness” approaches). 
142 See infra Part IV (suggesting a model for judicial reasoning in this area). 
143 See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (introducing this hypothetical); see infra 
Part III (analyzing the standards). 
144 See infra Part III.A (suggesting why the “plainly unreasonable” standard is correct and 
attempting to resolve potential criticisms of the standard). 
145 See infra Part III.A.1 (expounding on the correct mode of analysis for the different 
standards). 
146 See infra Part III.A.2 (differentiating between purely advisory policy statements and 
Sentencing Guidelines which were, pre-Booker, binding on the courts). 
147 See infra Part III.A.3 (analyzing the standards using canons of construction and general 
statutory interpretation principles). 
148 See infra Part III.B (asking whether the “plainly unreasonable” standard survived 
Booker and discussing the ease of severability of the section of the SRA that houses the 
“plainly unreasonable” standard). 
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the section of the SRA that houses the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard.149  Lastly, Part III.C addresses further questions surrounding 
the split among the circuits.150  It explains Rita and Gall’s impacts on the 
analysis of the correct post-Booker standard of review.151  It then 
deciphers whether Booker was trying to create an egalitarian sentencing 
system.152  Finally, it seeks to resolve whether a “plainly unreasonable” 
standard would result in greater sentencing disparities due to the larger 
degree of discretion afforded to trial courts (compared to the 
“reasonableness” standard).153 
A. The “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard as the Correct Standard 
In assessing whether the plainly unreasonable standard is correct, 
this Part first delves into the logical flaws present in some circuits’ 
decisions.154  Next, it compares the Chapter Seven Policy Statements and 
Sentencing Guidelines.155  Finally, it briefly explores canons of 
construction and statutory schematics.156 
1. The Logical Flaws Employed by Some of the Circuits 
Although the position taken by the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits in Tedford, Cotton, and Sweeting has initial allure because, even 
before Booker, appellate courts were uncertain how to define the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard, this logic does not survive close scrutiny.157  A 
                                                 
149 See infra Part III.B (discussing the ease of severability of the section of the SRA that 
houses the “plainly unreasonable” standard). 
150 See infra Part III.C (addressing some further peripheral questions surrounding the 
Booker decision and its aftermath). 
151 See infra Part III.C.1 (proposing that Rita and Gall did not solve the quandary 
confronted by this Note). 
152 See infra Part III.C.2 (suggesting that egalitarian sentencing was not Booker’s goal). 
153 See infra Part III.C.3 (dealing with the dilemma of sentencing disparities under the 
“reasonableness” standard).  
154  See infra Part III.A.1 (exploring weaknesses in some circuit court decisions). 
155  See infra Part III.A.2 (examining the policy statements and Sentencing Guidelines). 
156  See infra Part III.A.3 (dealing with various aspects of statutory construction). 
157 See generally United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2006) (providing a 
partial basis for the Eleventh Circuit’s position); United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159 
(10th Cir. 2005) (providing a partial basis for the Tenth Circuit’s position); United States v. 
Cotton, 399 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2005) (providing a partial basis for the Eighth Circuit’s 
position); Simonton, supra note 60, at 138 (“Tedford, Cotton, and Sweeting reach a clear 
definition of the standard by concluding that it is nothing more than a paraphrase of the 
normal reasonableness standard.”).  The appellate courts in these cases decided that 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)’s “plainly unreasonable” standard was synonymous with Booker’s 
“reasonableness” standard.  Simonton, supra note 60, at 138.  The courts made this 
determination by noting that Booker had cited earlier cases from their respective circuits 
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more careful look at the Booker passage relied on by the Eighth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits demonstrates that they misinterpreted the reason 
for Justice Breyer’s citation to White Face, Tsosie, and other similar 
cases.158  In referencing “reasonableness” standards, Booker was actually 
recognizing a difference between 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)’s “plainly 
unreasonable” standard and bare “reasonableness.”159  “Reasonableness” 
was the barometer that governed departures from the Sentencing 
Guidelines before 2003, “when Congress amended the statute to provide 
for de novo review of such decisions.”160  Booker actually referred to 
multiple standards, and, consequently, the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits were wrong to assume that because Booker referenced cases from 
                                                                                                             
apparently applying the “plainly unreasonable” standard as illustrations of an appellate 
court’s capacity in applying the “reasonableness” standard.  Id. at 137. 
Nor do we share the dissenters’ doubts about the practicality of a 
“reasonableness” standard of review. . . . The Act has long required 
their use in important sentencing circumstances—both on review of 
departures, and on review of sentences imposed where there was no 
applicable Guideline.  Together, these cases account for about 16.7% of 
sentencing appeals. . . . See also, e.g., United States v. White Face, United 
States v. Tsosie.  That is why we think it fair (and not, in Justice 
SCALIA’s words, a “gross exaggeratio[n],” to assume judicial 
familiarity with a “reasonableness” standard.  And that is why we 
believe that appellate judges will prove capable of facing with greater 
equanimity than would Justice SCALIA what he calls the “daunting 
prospect” of applying such a standard across the board. 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262–63 (2005) (citations omitted); see generally United 
States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004) (providing a source for the Eighth Circuit’s 
arguments), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 262); United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 
2004) (providing a source for the Tenth Circuit’s arguments), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 262. 
158 Simonton, supra note 60, at 138; see White Face, 383 F.3d at 737 (emphasis added) 
(“When there is no applicable sentencing guideline, as in the case of a revocation sentence, 
we review to determine whether the sentence was plainly unreasonable.”); Tsosie, 376 F.3d at 
1218 (quoting United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 774 (10th Cir. 1992)) (“Although the policy 
statements regarding revocation of supervised release are advisory rather than mandatory 
in nature, they must be ‘considered by the trial court in its deliberations concerning 
punishment for violation of conditions of supervised release.’”).  If the trial court “imposes 
a sentence in excess of that recommended in Chapter 7, ‘we will not reverse if it can be 
determined from the record to have been reasoned and reasonable.’”  Id. (emphasis added).  
“Mr. Tsosie argues the district court’s decision was plainly unreasonable . . . .”  Id. (emphasis 
added); see also Simonton, supra note 60, at 138 (explaining how the Supreme Court in 
Booker gave instances of the appellate courts’ wide-ranging acquaintance with and 
knowledge of “reasonableness” standards (not standard)).  Booker cited cases—including 
White Face and Tsosie—that apply either 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (“reasonableness” standard) 
or 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4) (“plainly unreasonable” standard).  Id. (citing Booker at 261–63).  
The Booker Court then went on to prove that appellate courts recurrently utilized a variety 
of different “reasonableness” standards.  Id. 
159 See id. (pointing out the importance of the usage of the plural “standards”). 
160 Id. at 139. 
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those circuits that used the “plainly unreasonable” benchmark, it was 
likening “plainly unreasonable” to “reasonableness.”161 
2. Policy Statements v. Guidelines 
A second potential criticism of the “plainly unreasonable” standard 
is the argument that it may not make sense for judges, in theory, to have 
greater discretion in post-revocation sentencing than in everyday, 
ordinary sentencing of defendants.162  This is because, after Booker, 
advisory Sentencing Guidelines and policy statements apply similarly to 
defendants.163  Nonetheless, this argument does not recognize that there 
is still a difference between the Sentencing Guidelines governing 
ordinary sentences and the advisory statements governing post-
revocation sentences.164 
The Chapter Seven policy statements are more “brief and 
rudimentary” than the Sentencing Guidelines that apply to original 
sentences, and they do not “take account of the myriad individual factors 
that could warrant a higher or lower postrevocation sentence . . . .”165  
                                                 
161 Id. at 138–39.  Justice Breyer, concurring, recognized two “reasonableness” standards, 
and even he specified that it was 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)’s reasonableness standard (not 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)’s “plainly unreasonable” standard) that was the guide for Booker’s 
reasonableness standard.  Id. at 139.  “Although Booker reasons that courts’ familiarity with 
the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard may assist with their application of the new standard, 
the opinion does not suggest that the relationship between the two standards goes any 
deeper.”  Id. at 140.  Therefore, “the approach taken by these courts does not accurately 
resolve the question of what becomes of the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard after Booker.”  
Id. 
162 Id. at 148–49 (using the “plainly unreasonable” standard for post-revocation review 
and the “reasonableness” standard for ordinary appellate review of sentencing 
determinations). 
163 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 220 (2005) (holding that the Sentencing 
Guidelines were purely advisory and that trial courts were required to take the Sentencing 
Guidelines into consideration, but were not bound by them); supra note 46 and 
accompanying text (explaining that the policy statements for sentences stemming from 
revocations of supervised release were, from the very beginning, purely advisory). 
164 See United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 763–66 (8th Cir. 1992) (detailing the 
difference between “general policy statements” and the Sentencing Guidelines). 
165 Simonton, supra note 60, at 149.  The Sentencing Guidelines Manual notes that:   
Given the relatively narrow ranges of incarceration available in many 
cases, combined with the potential difficulty in obtaining information 
necessary to determine specific offense characteristics, the Commission 
felt that it was undesirable at this time to develop [G]uidelines that 
attempt to distinguish, in detail, the wide variety of behavior that can 
lead to revocation.  Indeed, with the relatively low ceilings set by 
statute, revocation policy statements that attempted to delineate with 
great particularity the gradations of conduct leading to revocation 
would frequently result in a sentence at the statutory maximum 
penalty. 
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The policy statements were designed to give the district courts more 
discretion in post-revocation sentencing than in original sentencing.166  
This inherent flexibility distinguishes advisory policy statements from 
binding (pre-Booker) Sentencing Guidelines.167  Consequently, trial courts 
should still be able to exercise more discretion in sentencing a violator of 
a term of supervised release than in sentencing a Guideline offense 
violator.168 
3. Canons of Construction and Statutory Schematics 
Judge Posner’s sentiments in Kizeart about the incredible difficulty of 
differentiating and making fine-tooth distinctions between standards of 
review may also pose hurdles for the “plainly unreasonable” standard.169  
However, it is not up to appellate courts to dispose of intentional 
language inserted by the legislature and left in the statutory scheme after 
Booker.170  A classical canon of statutory construction directs courts to 
give full effect to every word in a statute so long as it does not render it 
contradictory.171  Therefore, despite the general trouble of distinguishing 
                                                                                                             
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2009). 
166 See Simonton, supra note 60, at 149 (discussing the enhanced flexibility built into the 
discretionary policy statements). 
167 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009) (noting the binding 
nature of Sentencing Guidelines). 
168 See Simonton, supra note 60, at 149 (focusing on the intrinsic differences between 
Sentencing Guidelines and policy statements). 
169 United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2007); see supra note 86 (elaborating 
on canons of statutory construction). 
170 Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675.  “[W]hile appellate courts understand and can implement the 
difference between deferential and nondeferential review, the making of finer gradations 
within the category of deferential review strains judicial competence . . . .”  Id.  It is true 
that 
[t]he gradations exist formally:  there is clear-error review, substantial-
evidence review, review for rationality (as of jury verdicts, where the 
test is whether any rational trier of fact could have arrived at the jury’s 
verdict), arbitrary-and-capricious review, abuse-of-discretion review, 
ultra-narrow review of credibility determinations based on a witness’s 
demeanor, and more. 
Id.  Yet in a majority of the cases, without regard to “the formal gradation of deferential 
review, the appellate judges are merely giving the benefit of the doubt to the trier of fact or 
other first-level decision maker . . . .”  Id.  “So while we must do our best to mark any 
gradations prescribed by Congress, we cannot promise great success in the endeavor.”  Id. 
171 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“It 
is our duty to give effect . . . to every clause and word of a statute. . . . We are thus 
reluctan[t] to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.”); see also cases cited supra 
note 86 (discussing statutory construction). 
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between the two potential standards, “plainly unreasonable” is the more 
convincing position.172 
B. Did the “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard Survive Booker? 
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have reasoned that Booker did not 
replace the “plainly unreasonable” standard based on the propositions 
that “the plainly unreasonable standard exists in parts of [18 U.S.C.] 
§ 3742 that Booker did not touch, and second, unlike the [Sentencing] 
[G]uidelines that apply to ordinary sentences, Chapter [Seven] has 
always been merely advisory and therefore did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment.”173  Other segments of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 besides § 3742(e)(4) 
(the section severed and excised by Booker) contain the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard.174 
Since Booker, appellate courts have continued to apply the other 
standards that are found in both 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a) and (e), including 
3742(a)(1), (a)(2), (e)(1) and (e)(2), which allow for appellate review of 
sentences resulting from “an incorrect application of the [S]entencing 
[G]uidelines.”175  The implicit reason why courts have continued to 
                                                 
172 See Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675 (supporting the “plainly unreasonable” standard). 
173 See Simonton, supra note 60, at 140 (explaining that the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have 
found that Booker had no effect on the pertinent standard). 
174 See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 2006).  The Fourth Circuit 
explained the standard this way: 
[T]he structure of [18 U.S.C.] § 3742 suggests that “plainly 
unreasonable” is the proper standard of review for revocation 
sentences.  Under [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(a)(4)—a provision not invalidated 
by Booker—a defendant sentenced for violating supervised release is 
authorized to appeal only on the ground that his sentence is “plainly 
unreasonable.” 
Id. at 437.  The court inferred from this provision that revocation sentences should be 
reviewed under this same standard.  Id. at 437–38.  “It would seem incongruous that a 
defendant limited to asserting that his revocation sentence is ‘plainly unreasonable,’ would 
be allowed to argue that his sentence should be reversed because it is ‘unreasonable.’”  Id. 
at 437.  Pertinent “[G]uideline commentary and statutory provisions also suggest that 
revocation sentences should not be treated exactly the same as original sentences.”  Id.; see 
United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “Booker left [18 
U.S.C. §§] 3742(a), 3742(b), and 3742(f) on the books”); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (2009) (noting that the imposition of an apt 
punishment for any new criminal activity is not the main goal of a revocation sentence, 
rather, the sentence imposed following revocation is meant to sanction the violator for 
failing to abide by the conditions of his or her supervised release). 
175 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009).  18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), (a)(2) and 3742 
(e)(1), (e)(2) provide: 
§ 3742.  Review of a sentence 
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apply these sections post-Booker, while shying away from the application 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(4) and (e)(4), is that “the latter contains something 
that more closely resembles a standard of review, and therefore appears 
to conflict more readily with Booker’s reasonableness standard.”176  Yet, 
because Booker did not eliminate all mention of “plainly unreasonable” in 
the statutory scheme, the standard lives on post-Booker.177 
Both Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion and Justice Stevens’ dissent 
suggest that the only part of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) that Booker sought to 
remove was the de novo review provision, which made the Sentencing 
Guidelines even more mandatory than they had been before the 2003 
amendments to the section, and which was found to violate the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, not § 3742(e)(4)’s “plainly 
unreasonable” standard.178  Therefore, the Court did not intend Booker to 
eliminate the “plainly unreasonable” standard.179 
                                                                                                             
(a) APPEAL BY A DEFENDANT.—A defendant may file a notice of appeal 
in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the 
sentence— 
 (1) was imposed in violation of law; 
 (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the 
[S]entencing [G]uidelines . . . . 
. . . . 
(e) . . . Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine 
whether the sentence— 
 (1) was imposed in violation of law; 
 (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the 
[S]entencing [G]uidelines . . .  
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)–(a)(2), (e)(1)–(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009); see Simonton, supra note 60, 
at 142 (noting the activity in the appellate courts). 
176 Simonton, supra note 60, at 142. 
177 Id. 
178 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).  The Booker Court related that the 
application of these criteria indicates that they “must sever and excise two” provisions:  
“the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable 
Guidelines range (in the absence of circumstances that justify a departure) and the 
provision that sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of 
departures from the applicable Guidelines range.”  Id. (citation omitted).  With the excision 
of these two statutory sections “(and statutory cross-references to the two sections 
consequently invalidated), the remainder of the Act satisfies the Court’s constitutional 
requirements.”  Id.  “[T]he majority creates a new category of cases in which this Court may 
invalidate any part or parts of a statute (and add others) when it concludes that Congress 
would have preferred a modified system to administering the statute in compliance with 
the Constitution.”  Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
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Furthermore, the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have doubted 
that Booker’s “reasonableness” standard applied to post-revocation 
sentences, as these sentences were never administered according to the 
troublesome mandatory Sentencing Guidelines; the sentencing for post-
revocation appeals “was discretionary before Booker and is discretionary 
after it.”180  While the Booker Court expressed its holding as “a ‘severance 
and excision’ of [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e), it never stated that it was declaring 
the provision invalid in . . . appeals from [non-standard Sentencing] 
Guideline sentences. . . . Thus, the question becomes 
whether . . . [Booker’s] severance . . . should apply to postrevocation 
sentencing” as well.181  Booker suggests that the answer is no.182 
Booker did not directly address whether it could sever 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(e)’s function in ordinary sentencing appeals (for which it was 
found to be unconstitutional) from its application to post-revocation 
sentencing appeals.183  “However, it is too simplistic and mechanical to 
assume . . . that the Court’s invalidation of [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e) extends 
to the postrevocation context just because the Court used the words 
‘severed’ and ‘excised’ in the context of ordinary sentencing appeals.”184  
Conversely, Booker stated that it was necessary to “retain those portions 
of the Act that are (1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of ‘functioning 
independently,’ and (3) consistent with Congress’ basic objectives in 
enacting the statute,” and that courts need to abstain from nullifying any 
more of a statute or statutory scheme than is required.185 
Because the policy statements that apply to post-revocation 
sentences are only advisory provisions that suggest, not require, the 
imposition of particular sentences, post-revocation sentences have never 
posed the problems of mandatory Sentencing Guidelines that were the 
focus of the Booker Court; therefore, the severance of the unconstitutional 
                                                                                                             
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
179 Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. 
180 United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 817 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rush, 132 
F.App’x 54, 56 (7th Cir. 2005). 
181 See Simonton, supra note 60, at 144 (posing a question that cuts to the heart of the split 
among the circuits). 
182 See Vermeule, supra note 60, at 1950 n.26 (stating that courts can sever uses or portions 
of a statute that are unconstitutional from applications that are valid and can continue to 
apply the constitutional portions), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 247. 
183 See Simonton, supra note 60, at 145 (noting that Booker did not address the statutory 
construction issue that contributed to the creation of the split among the circuits). 
184 Id. at 145. 
185 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005) (citations omitted). 
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portions of the statutory scheme need not affect the post-revocation 
policy statements and their corresponding standard of review.186 
C. Further Questions Surrounding the Issue of Choosing a Standard 
Part III.C addresses some further peripheral questions surrounding 
the Booker decision and its aftermath.  These include:  whether 
subsequent cases have clarified what the Supreme Court sees as the 
correct standard; whether Booker was attempting to create egalitarian 
sentencing; and lastly, whether the “plainly unreasonable” standard 
results in larger sentencing disparities due to the greater discretion 
afforded to trial courts.187 
1. Did Rita  and Gall Resolve What the Standard Should Be? 
In Bolds, the Sixth Circuit used two post-Booker decisions, Rita v. 
United States and Gall v. United States, to decide the proper standard of 
review for revocations of supervised release.188  The Bolds court 
                                                 
186 See id. at 233.  Booker stated: 
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory 
provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of 
particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use 
would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.  We have never doubted 
the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a 
sentence within a statutory range.  Indeed, everyone agrees that the 
constitutional issues presented by these cases would have been 
avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the SRA the provisions 
that make the [Sentencing] Guidelines binding on district judges; it is 
that circumstance that makes the Court’s answer to the second 
question presented possible.  For when a trial judge exercises his 
discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the 
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the 
judge deems relevant.  The [Sentencing] Guidelines as written, 
however, are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all 
judges. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 
(2000) (noting that it is possible for judges to exercise discretion within the confines of 
statutory guidance and the Constitution). 
187 See infra Part III.C.1–3 (discussing emerging issues in choosing a uniform standard). 
188 United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 573–80 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Rita v. United States, 
551 U.S. 338, 340 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).  In Rita, the Defendant 
was convicted of perjury; and, on appeal, he asserted that his sentence was unreasonable.  
551 U.S. at 340.  The Gall Court stated that in two cases argued last term the Court 
“considered the standard that courts of appeals should apply when reviewing the 
reasonableness of sentences imposed by district judges.”  552. U.S. at 40.  “Rita v. United 
States, involved a sentence within the range recommended by the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.”  Id. (citation omitted) (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 351).  The Court “held that when 
a district judge’s discretionary decision in a particular case accords with the sentence the 
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determined that the other circuits’ analyses failed to fill in all of the 
fissures left by Booker.189  “For this, the Sixth Circuit looked to the recent 
opinions by the Supreme Court in Rita and Gall.”190  However, neither 
Rita nor Gall dealt specifically with reviews of revocation of supervised 
release; both cases, though, acknowledged the bewilderment and 
dissonance of the appellate courts reviewing sentencing appeals post-
Booker.191 
Though it could be argued that Rita provided some insight into 
Booker (i.e., that Booker replaced the de novo standard of review required 
by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) with an abuse-of-discretion standard, the 
“reasonableness” review), this is an improper inference.192  That is 
because Rita was not considering a sentence imposed for revocation of 
supervised release.193  The Supreme Court was actually, in fact, 
considering a sentence imposed for testifying falsely before a grand jury, 
a traditional Sentencing Guideline offense.194 
The Bolds court further looked to Gall to attempt to discern the 
correct standard.195  The Bolds court concluded that the majority of the 
Supreme Court in Gall held that Booker had made it clear that the familiar 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate review 
of all sentencing decisions.196  However, dissenting in Gall, Justice Alito 
stated that Booker fell short of “explain[ing] exactly what it meant by a 
system of ‘advisory’ [Sentencing] [G]uidelines or by ‘reasonableness’ 
                                                                                                             
United States Sentencing Commission deems appropriate ‘in the mine run of cases,’ the 
court of appeals may presume that the sentence is reasonable.”  Id.  The Gall Court found 
that the appellate court’s rule requiring “proportional” justifications for departures was 
inconsistent with Booker.  Hall, supra note 10, at 419.  Under the deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard that applied to review of sentencing decisions, the appellate court had 
failed to give due deference to the district court’s reasoned and reasonable decision.  Gall, 
552 U.S. at 40; see Hall, supra note 10, at 416–17 (discussing Gall). 
189 Bolds, 511 F.3d at 577; see Hall, supra note 10, at 418 (discussing Bolds). 
190 Hall, supra note 10, at 418. 
191 Id. 
192 Rita, 551 U.S. at 340; see Hall, supra note 10, at 418 (“By shedding light on the Court’s 
intent in Booker, Rita provided the Sixth Circuit with guidance in determining the proper 
standard of review for sentences imposed after revocation of supervised release.”).  
“Finally, Rita and supporting amici here claim that the [Sentencing] Guidelines sentence is 
not reasonable under [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) because it expressly declines to consider various 
personal characteristics of the defendant . . . .  Rita did not make this argument below, and 
we shall not consider it.”  Rita, 551 U.S. at 360. 
193 Id. 
194 Id.  “[T]he crimes at issue are perjury and obstruction of justice.  In essence those 
offenses involved the making of knowingly false, material statements under oath before a 
grand jury, thereby impeding its criminal investigation.”  Id. at 359. 
195 United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 38). 
196 Id.; see Hall, supra note 10, at 418 (discussing Gall and Bolds). 
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review, and [that] the opinion is open to different interpretations.”197  
Based on Gall’s statement that, as “the [Sentencing] Guidelines are now 
advisory, and appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to 
determining whether they are ‘reasonable,’ . . . [and] the familiar abuse-
of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate review of 
sentencing decisions,” the Bolds court found that Booker directed 
appellate courts to apply the “reasonableness” standard to review 
supervised release revocation sentences.198 
2. Was Booker Trying to Create an Egalitarian Sentencing System? 
Some commentators have read Booker as endeavoring “to create an 
egalitarian system by which all sentences are governed by advisory 
[Sentencing] Guidelines and are judged by the same standard of review 
on appeal.”199  However, Booker’s true aim was to ensure that trial courts 
had more discretion, not less; reducing the discretion afforded district 
courts on appeals of revocations of supervised release is actually 
contrary to the spirit of Booker’s holding.200  “Such a reading of Booker 
would place the loose, flexible grid system envisioned by the Sentencing 
Commission for revocation sentences on the same level as the precise 
[Sentencing] [G]uideline system devised for original sentences.”201  The 
inherent differences between Sentencing Guidelines, which were 
mandatory pre-Booker, and advisory policy statements, which have never 
been mandatory, lends credence to this conclusion.  Plainly, curtailing 
the discretion of trial courts by imposing a less deferential standard of 
review for examining post-revocation sentences contradicts Booker’s 
intention of broadening the sentencing discretion of district courts “and 
                                                 
197 Gall, 552 U.S. at 62 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting); see Hall, supra note 10, at 418 
(discussing the dissent in Gall). 
198 Gall, 552 U.S. at 46; Bolds, 511 F.3d at 575; see Hall, supra note 10, at 418 (discussing Rita 
and Gall). 
199 Simonton, supra note 60, at 150 (emphasis added); see Bissonnette, supra note 64, at 
1497 (reading Booker to create egalitarian sentencing); see also WHITMAN, supra note 64, at 
53–54 (evidencing an emerging egalitarian approach towards sentencing by liberals in 
Congress). 
200 See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 n.9 (4th Cir. 2006).  The Cudrup court 
explained that: 
It would be an odd result if Booker were interpreted to reduce the level 
of discretion district courts have always had to devise revocation 
sentences under policy statements that have uniformly been deemed 
non-binding while giving district courts more discretion to impose 
original sentences under [G]uidelines that were deemed binding until 
Booker. 
Id. 
201 Id. 
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ignores the differences in structure between the Chapter [Seven] policy 
statements and the ordinary [Sentencing] Guidelines.”202 
3. Does a “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard Result in Greater 
Sentencing Disparities Due to the Larger Degree of Discretion 
Afforded to Trial Courts? 
The concern of unwarranted sentencing disparities due to the greater 
degree of discretion awarded to trial courts by allowing them to continue 
to use the “plainly unreasonable” standard can be addressed by an 
examination of the context of revocations of supervised release.203  There 
are low statutory ceilings on sentences for violations of supervised 
release.204  Furthermore, supervised release is more akin to probation 
                                                 
202 Simonton, supra note 60, at 150. 
203 See id. at 149 (stating that giving trial courts more discretion in the context of 
revocations of supervised release poses a good deal less risk of sentencing inconsistencies, 
than it would in the normal sentencing context due to “the low statutory ceilings on most 
postrevocation sentences”).  “The vast majority of postrevocation sentences are for 
violations of supervised release.”  Id. 
204 Id.  There are different grades of supervised release violations: 
§ 7B1.1.  Classification of Violations (Policy Statement) 
(a) There are three grades of probation and supervised release 
violations: 
(1) Grade A Violations—conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, 
or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 
one year that (i) is a crime of violence, (ii) is a controlled 
substance offense, or (iii) involves possession of a firearm or 
destructive device of a type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); or (B) 
any other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of 
imprisonment exceeding twenty years; 
(2) Grade B Violations—conduct constituting any other federal, 
state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment 
exceeding one year; 
(3) Grade C Violations—conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, 
or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year 
or less; or (B) a violation of any other condition of supervision. 
(b) Where there is more than one violation of the conditions of 
supervision, or the violation includes conduct that constitutes more 
than one offense, the grade of the violation is determined by the 
violation having the most serious grade. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009).  These grades correspond to the 
level of punishment the defendant will receive: 
§ 7B1.4.  Term of Imprisonment (Policy Statement) 
(a) The range of imprisonment applicable upon revocation is set forth 
in the following table: 
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than imprisonment, making violations less serious than those of other 
sentences.205  According to the Sentencing Commission, their decision to 
enact sweeping policy statements instead of strict, meticulous Sentencing 
Guidelines was based in part on the constricted ranges provided for 
                                                                                                             
   
Revocation Table 
(in months of imprisonment) 
Criminal History Category* 
Grade of 
Violation  I II III IV V VI 
Grade C  3–9 4–10 5–11 6–12 7–13 8–14 
Grade B  4–10 6–12 8–14 12–18 18–24 21–27 
Grade A (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) below: 
   12–18 15–21 18–24 24–30 30–37 33–41 
  (2) Where the defendant was on probation or supervised release as a 
result of a sentence for a Class A felony: 
   24–30 27–33 30–37 37–46 46–57 51–63. 
 
Id. 
205 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009).  The Guidelines stipulate 
the following: 
The conditions of supervised release authorized by statute are the 
same as those for a sentence of probation, except for intermittent 
confinement.  (Intermittent confinement is available for a sentence of 
probation, but is available as a condition of supervised release only for 
a violation of a condition of supervised release.)  When the court finds 
that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, it may 
continue the defendant on supervised release, with or without 
extending the term or modifying the conditions, or revoke supervised 
release and impose a term of imprisonment.  The periods of 
imprisonment authorized by statute for a violation of the conditions of 
supervised release generally are more limited, however, than those 
available for a violation of the conditions of probation. 
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)). 
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sentencing violators of the terms of their supervised release.206  Strict 
Sentencing Guidelines would have laid out specific progressions leading 
to revocation of supervised release and would have instituted another 
form of punishment.207 
Considering all of these issues, this Note proposes a definitive 
standard for resolving appeals of revocations of supervised release:  the 
standard adopted by a minority of the circuits—“plainly 
unreasonable.”208  The examination of many of the problems with the 
analyses performed by some of the circuits, namely the Eighth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, strengthens this proposition.209  The differences 
between policy statements and Sentencing Guidelines also weigh into 
the debate.210  Furthermore, the canon of construction, which directs the 
courts to give full effect to every word in a statute so long as it does not 
render it contradictory, dictates that it is not up to the courts to dispose 
of intentional language inserted by the legislature and left in the 
statutory scheme after Booker.211 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Circuit splits, such as the one presented above, are detrimental to 
our system of justice and undermine the credibility of the judiciary.212  It 
is of paramount importance that such splits are resolved and consistent 
standards applied.213  The following model approach, the proposed 
application note to the Sentencing Guidelines, and explanation and 
policy arguments strive to choose the best alternative and propose a 
method for instituting this choice.214 
                                                 
206  Simonton, supra note 60, at 134; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A 
(2009). 
207 Simonton, supra note 60, at 134; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A 
(2009). 
208 See infra Part IV (proffering “plainly unreasonable” as the best standard). 
209 See supra Part III.A (attempting to resolve potential criticisms of the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard). 
210 See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining the difference between binding Sentencing 
Guidelines (pre-Booker) and advisory policy statements). 
211 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing canons of construction and statutory schematics). 
212 See supra Parts II–III (outlining and analyzing the split among the circuits). 
213 See infra Part IV.B (proposing “plainly unreasonable” as the rightful standard and 
stating the policy arguments in favor of a resolution of the split among the circuits in this 
area). 
214 See infra Part IV (advancing the “plainly unreasonable” standard). 
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A. The Plainly Unreasonable Approach and How to Apply It 
Currently, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits utilize the “plainly 
reasonable” standard for reviewing post-revocation sentences, though it 
is the minority position among the appellate courts.215  This uniform 
standard is the best choice given a balancing of the inherent strengths 
and weaknesses of both standards.216  As it is unclear which portion of 
the SRA Booker meant to excise, there would otherwise be construction 
and interpretation issues, and there are inherent problems with using a 
“reasonableness” standard; thus, “plainly unreasonable” is the best 
choice.217 
Even though the differences between the two standards may, in 
practice, be difficult to distinguish, the courts should attempt to give the 
words their full effect, as they were purposefully inserted by Congress.218  
This approach would pay respect to the difference between 
“reasonableness” and “plainly unreasonable,” and return the 
standardization and regularity to sentencing that existed under the SRA, 
but which, post-Booker, has proven elusive. 
While it is important that the appellate courts apply a uniform 
standard when deciding similar cases, the judiciary should endeavor to 
more succinctly define what that standard is to ensure consistent results.  
The Kizeart court expounded on this difficulty, and noted that the 
difference between the “reasonableness” standard and the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard is “slight.”219  Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit 
went on to attempt to explain the fine nuances that exist in the scale of 
deference applied in different types of cases.220  While they have 
                                                 
215 See supra Part II.C (explaining the “plainly unreasonable” approach and 
methodologies and theories of the subscribing circuits). 
216 See supra Part III (focusing on what activity has taken place in the circuits post-Booker 
and delving into some of the strengths and weaknesses of the differing approaches, and 
whether any subsequent Supreme Court cases have shed light on what the Supreme Court 
views to be the correct approach). 
217 See infra Part IV (proffering “plainly unreasonable” as the best standard). 
218 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing canons of construction and statutory schematics). 
219 United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007). 
220 Id. at 675.  The court explained that many gradations exist including:  clear-error 
review, substantial-evidence standards, review for rationality, arbitrary-and-capricious 
review, abuse-of-discretion review, an ultra-narrow type review of credibility 
determinations, and others.  Id.  However, “regardless of the formal gradation of 
deferential review,” the appellate judge is focused mainly on how much of the benefit of 
the doubt to give to the lower court decision maker.  Id.  This depends, in addition to the 
formal standard of review, on “the nature of the issue and the institutional competence of 
the first-level decision maker relative to that of the appellate court.”  Id.  However, in this 
entire process, an appellate court must do its best to recognize and effectuate any 
gradations set down by Congress.  Id. 
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recognized that there is a difference between the two standards, 
implementing this difference has proven difficult.221  This is true even 
though there are strong reasons why a different standard of review 
should be applied to appeals of revocations of supervised release than to 
appeals from sentences imposed under the once mandatory, now 
discretionary, Sentencing Guidelines.222  The Kizeart court attempted to 
give a guidepost for sorting through and pithily defining the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard.223  The Seventh Circuit borrowed from “the 
present class of cases [which utilize] the narrowest judicial review of 
judgments we know, and that is judicial review of the sanctions imposed 
by prison disciplinary boards.”224  The appellate court concluded that 
“[s]uch sanctions must indeed be ‘plainly’ unreasonable to be set 
aside.”225 
The following is a proposed sequential analysis of an appeal of a 
revocation of supervised release, taking into account the Seventh 
Circuit’s guidepost of analogizing these types of determinations to the 
familiar standard of review used in examining sanctions imposed by 
prison disciplinary review boards.  This position also borrows from the 
Fourth Circuit’s sequential outline developed in Crudup.226  This Note 
proposes that the following sequential analysis be added as an 
application note to the policy statement governing violations of 
supervised release within Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines: 
 
                                                 
221 See Sch. Dist. of Wisconsin Dells v. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Aegerter v. City of Delafield, 174 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1999)) (stating that “‘it is 
possible, though not always easy,’ to distinguish among the canonical standards of review, 
such as substantial evidence and clear error” review, and acknowledging the “‘skepticism’” 
which has emerged “‘in the past about the ability of judges to apply more than a few 
standards of review’”). 
222 See supra Part III (weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the differing approaches 
and asking whether any subsequent Supreme Court cases have shed light on what the 
Supreme Court views to be the correct approach).  These strong reasons include:  that there 
are important inherent differences between policy statements and Sentencing Guidelines, 
that canons of construction and statutory schematics require differentiation between the 
advisory policy statements and the previously mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, and that 
reducing the amount of discretion given to trial courts in handing out supervised release 
revocation sentences is contrary to the spirit of the Supreme Court’s holding in Booker.  See 
supra Part III (presenting the strengths and weaknesses of the differing approaches). 
223 Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675. 
224 Id; see cases cited supra note 86 (discussing the ability of courts to distinguish among 
different standards of review). 
225 Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675. 
226 See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438–39 (4th Cir. 2006) (requiring a 
reviewing court to first determine if the trial court’s sentence is “reasonable,” and only 
moving on to “plainly unreasonable” scrutiny if the sentence does not pass the 
“reasonableness” threshold). 
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Application Note:227 
 
1. In deciding whether a sentence is “plainly unreasonable,” the first step 
shall be to determine whether the sentence is “reasonable.”228  Both 
procedure and substance are entered into the equation, as well as the 
distinct nature of supervised release revocation sentences.229  The court 
undertakes this analysis keeping in mind the deferential nature of the 
standard, as well as the Chapter 7 policy statements and statutory 
constraints of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 
pertinent to revocation sentences.230  The appellate court, in due course, 
                                                 
227 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7 (2009).  The proposed application note is 
italicized and is the contribution of the author. 
228  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7 (2009). 
229 Id. 
According to [18 U.S.C.] § 3583(e), in devising a revocation sentence 
the district court is not authorized to consider whether the revocation 
sentence “reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense, . . . promote[s] 
respect for the law, and . . . provide[s] just punishment for the 
offense,’’ [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(2)(A), or whether there are other ‘‘kinds 
of sentences available,’’ [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(3). 
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. 
230 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7 
(2009).  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence: 
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect 
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; 
and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the 
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines— 
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 
994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any 
amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress 
(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be 
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments 
issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect 
on the date the defendant is sentenced; or 
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, 
the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the 
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has extensive discretion to rescind its sentence and impose a new 
sentence.231  Only if the appellate court determines that a revocation of 
supervised release is not “reasonable” should it turn to the second step 
of analyzing whether such sentence is “plainly unreasonable.”232  If the 
sentence satisfies the requirement of “reasonableness,” it should be 
affirmed without further scrutiny; if the revocation of supervised 
release sentence is substantively or procedurally “unreasonable,” then 
the appellate court must decide if it is “plainly” so.233  “Plain” is 
synonymous with apparent or evident, and, while a revocation of a 
supervised release sentence must “bear some indicia of reliability,” it 
need only cross a “meager threshold.”234 
                                                                                                             
Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, 
United States Code, taking into account any amendments made to 
such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress 
(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be 
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments 
issued under section 994(p) of title 28); 
(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 
994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments 
made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of 
whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the 
Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) 
of title 28); and 
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the 
date the defendant is sentenced[;] 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553. 
231 United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Pelensky, 129 
F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1997).  The Lewis court also rightly held that “a court’s statement of its 
reasons for going beyond non-binding policy statements in imposing a sentence after 
revoking a defendant’s supervised release term need not be as specific as has been required 
when courts departed from [G]uidelines that were, before Booker, considered to be 
mandatory.”  Lewis, 424 F.3d at 245; see Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438–39. 
232 Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438–39. 
233 Id. 
234 The definition of “plainly unreasonable” from the judicial review of the sanctions 
imposed by prison disciplinary boards proves useful at this juncture.  Id.; see Scruggs v. 
Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming the dismissal of an inmate’s habeas 
appeal stemming from discipline imposed by a prison’s Conduct Adjustment Board, as the 
disciplinary decision was “supported by at least ‘some evidence’”); United States v. 
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007).  The Moulden court held that the court, post-
Crudup, “must first determine whether the sentence is unreasonable.”  Moulden, 478 F.3d at 
656 (citing Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438).  The court additionally stated that: 
This initial inquiry takes a more “deferential appellate posture 
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion” than 
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B. Commentary 
Confusion and disparate standards among the appellate courts in the 
federal system is detrimental to our system of justice, which rests on 
ideals of fairness and even-handed application of the laws to our 
citizenry.  As reviews of revocations of supervised release are criminal 
matters, striking at the heart of constitutional ideals, coherence is 
particularly valuable.  Moreover, “[t]he standards of review can function 
as intended only if the meaning of each standard is understood 
consistently among judges of the reviewing courts.”235 
It follows that a uniform standard must be chosen and applied, with 
courts paying acute attention to the import of the particular standard 
involved in that case.  The standard of review is significant, as evidenced 
by the fact that the rules of most courts specifically require the appellant 
to state the applicable standard of review for each issue addressed in its 
brief.236  It is vital that courts do not forget that distinguishing among 
levels of deference is important, and that their duty is to attempt to give 
its significance the full force intended by the legislature.  It is necessary 
to gather all of the circuits onto the same page, and to require them to 
apply a consistent standard of review for revocations of supervised 
release. 
Counter to the theory subscribed to by a majority of the appellate 
courts deciding the issue, Booker did not excise the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard traditionally applied to sentencing appeals of 
supervised release revocations.237  Altering the pre-Booker “plainly 
                                                                                                             
reasonableness review for [Sentencing] [G]uidelines sentences.  Of 
course, as always, the sentencing court must consider the policy 
statements contained in Chapter 7, including the policy statement 
range, as “helpful assistance,” and must also consider the applicable 
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.  At the same time, however, the 
sentencing court retains broad discretion to revoke a defendant’s 
[supervised release] and impose a term of imprisonment up to the 
statutory maximum.  The court must provide a statement of reasons 
for the sentence imposed, as with the typical sentencing procedure, but 
this statement “need not be as specific as has been required” for 
departing from a traditional guidelines range.  Only if this modified 
“reasonableness” analysis leads us to conclude that the sentence was 
unreasonable, do we ask whether it is “plainly” so, “relying on the 
definition of ‘plain’ [used] in our ‘plain’ error analysis”—that is, 
“clear” or “obvious.” 
Id. at 656–57 (citations omitted). 
235 Storm, supra note 93, at 89 (noting that the standard of review used does matter). 
236 Id. at 74. 
237 Simonton, supra note 60, at 153.  “Although the possibility of replacing the rather 
‘unusual’ ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard with a more familiar reasonableness standard is 
understandably alluring to these courts, Booker provides little support for such a result.”  Id. 
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unreasonable” standard is contradictory to Congress’s intent, as shown 
by its side-by-side comparison of the two different “standards of review 
in the pre-2003 version of [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e).”238  Furthermore, such a 
conclusion “overlooks the fact that courts can easily sever [18 U.S.C.] 
§ 3742(e)’s application to postrevocation [sic] sentences from its other 
applications and therefore salvage the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard 
for future use.”239  Rather than erasing the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard, appellate courts should make an effort to tangibly define and 
use the standard, which is, as demonstrated by the minority of circuits, 
capable of application. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
United States v. Booker impacted the United States sentencing system 
in a forceful way.  Two chief questions raised by the appellate courts in 
this area have proven difficult to answer, though not impossible to 
resolve:  first, whether the Booker Court intended to replace the “plainly 
unreasonable” standard with the “reasonableness” standard in 
reviewing revocations of supervised release, and, second, whether the 
two standards are meaningfully different.240 
This Note has analyzed the current state of the resulting split among 
the circuits as well as the differing standards currently being utilized in 
the federal appellate system.241  Although a majority of the circuits have 
gravitated toward “reasonableness,” they internally diverge regarding 
whether there is a workable difference between the “plainly 
unreasonable” and the “reasonableness” standards.242  A minority of the 
circuits have conversely chosen the “plainly unreasonable” review as 
their standard.243  Furthermore, additional circuits have not addressed 
this matter or chosen a standard that they see as appropriate for 
reviewing appeals of revocations of supervised release.244  There are 
strengths and weaknesses in both the majority and minority standards, 
                                                 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 See supra Part II.B (expanding on these two important questions stemming from 
Booker). 
241 See supra Part III (focusing on what activity has taken place in the circuits post-Booker 
and discussing some of the strengths and weaknesses of the differing approaches, and 
whether any subsequent Supreme Court cases have shed any light on what the Supreme 
Court views to be the correct approach). 
242 See supra Part II.D (analyzing and expounding upon the current majority standard). 
243 See supra Part II.C (analyzing the current minority standard). 
244 See supra Part II.D (noting that not all circuits have undertaken a review of the 
standards nor decided on a correct approach). 
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and it remains unclear what the Supreme Court views to be the correct 
guidepost.245 
As the minority of the federal circuits has correctly decided, the 
“plainly unreasonable” standard lives on after Booker.246  This becomes 
clearer upon a close inspection of the several problems intrinsic to the 
analyses used by the circuits that have chosen the “reasonableness” 
standard.247  The flaws of the “reasonableness” standard render it the 
weaker of the two positions, and thus “plainly unreasonable” is the 
correct standard of review applicable to revocations of supervised 
release.248 
The result is that Luci will now have a clear understanding of 
whether and how she should appeal the federal district court’s decision 
to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.249  Luci will also now know that 
the district court’s determination will be given a large degree of 
deference, just as it was before Booker.250  She will additionally have a 
lucid understanding that “plainly unreasonable” is the adopted 
standard.251  But most importantly, perhaps, she will know that she is 
receiving the same treatment as defendants in her shoes in every 
appellate court across the nation.  That is the greatest victory for the 
resolution of this split among the circuits. 
Anne E. Zygadlo* 
                                                 
245 See supra Part III (giving an analysis of the standards). 
246 See supra Part IV (proposing “plainly unreasonable” as the rightful standard). 
247 See supra Part III (laying out the circuits’ analyses of the standards). 
248 See supra Part IV (advancing “plainly unreasonable” as the appropriate standard). 
249 See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (introducing this hypothetical). 
250 See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (presenting this hypothetical). 
251 See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (providing the facts to this hypothetical). 
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